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Abstract 
 
This thesis analysis hunger strikes as a specific protest tactic and aims to contributes to the 
understanding of where, when and how hunger strikes are most likely to reach their intended 
goals. By using a dataset consisting of media-reported hunger strikes, it demonstrated that a 
combination of hunger strike-specific- and political context factors can to some extent 
determine the likelihoods of what is identified as four distinct hunger strike outcomes 
(concession, surrender, death and forced end). 
Various hypothesis on hunger strike outcomes have been tested against the dataset by 
applying the statistical method multinomial logit. Findings show that coalition governments 
are more willing to grant concessions to hunger strikers and that states are able to learn from 
previous hunger strikes in order to avoid deaths. The findings also shows that hunger strikes 
have slightly better chances to gain concessions in non-democracies.  
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King: … He has chosen death: 
Refusing to eat or drink, that he may bring 
Disgrace upon me; for there is a custom, 
An old and foolish custom, that if a man 
Be wronged, or think that he is wronged, and starve 
Upon another’s threshold till he die, 
The Common People, for all time to come 
Will raise a heavy cry against that threshold, 
Even though it be the King’s. 
 
The King’s Threshold, William B. Yeats1 
                                                 
1
 As quoted in Beresford (1994: 9). 
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 Introduction 1
Hunger striking is a disruptive tactic of political protest: by the threat of starvation, a body is 
turned into a bargaining resource against an opponent. Among the most famous hunger 
strikers from last century, there’s a great diversity of actors, their goals and the target of their 
protest: The British suffragettes’ struggle for women’s right to vote (1909-1914), Irish 
republicans struggle (1917 and 1981), Mahatma Gandhi as the symbol of India’s anti-colonial 
struggle (1932, 1943 and 1948), and more recently: Guantanamo Bay prisoners struggle for 
legal rights (2005 and 2013) and the Russian punk band Pussy Riot’s protest against their 
imprisonment in Russia (2012 and 2013). The status of some of these hunger strikers today 
illustrates some of its enormous potential. While the tactic is regarded as a desperate, “last 
resort”, tactic, some empirical evidence also suggests that it is highly effective (Scanlan et al., 
2008: 299). Still, research explaining its efficacy is absent. This thesis therefore aims to 
enhance the knowledge of this specific protest tactic by analyzing a unique dataset of hunger 
strike events from between 1906 and 2004.  
 Research question 1.1
While proponents of non-violent tactics praises hunger strikes as morally superior (Sharp, 
1973), others question its effectiveness and the surroundings by which it can be successfully 
carried out. The Indian political activist Arundhati Roy claims non-violent tactics such as 
hunger strikes are not effective in “police-states”, dictatorships or in situations of deep 
poverty, and asks rhetorically whether the hungry can go on hunger strike (Popham, 2011). 
Nelson Mandela, who participated in several hunger strikes during his incarceration in 
Robben Island prison, found the tactic to be over-idealistic and sometimes counterproductive 
(Mandela, 1995: 502-503). Still, according to Scanlan, Stoll and Lumm (2008: 299), over 75 
% of the hunger strikes in their data set experienced a positive outcome. At the same time, 
Scanlan et al. questions the meaning of success in protests as does Gamson (1975: 28), and 
calls for more research in order to understand the results of hunger strikes. Scholars have also 
requested additional research on the collective nature of hunger strikes (Biggs, 2007: 19) and 
the conceptualization of hunger strikes and their significance to social movements (Scanlan et 
al., 2008: 314). It has been pointed out that researchers tend to emphasize the extreme 
outcomes of hunger strike, like death, leaving out the rest (Healy, 1982: 225). 
While many researchers have asked why and how protests happen, few have tried to 
analyze what causes different outcomes.  
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Hunger strikes seem to be a very effective political tactic, yet there is little research 
within political science trying to understand this tactic and its relation to political regimes and 
governments. In social movements, and especially hunger strikes, the question of success is 
problematic. Rather, I suggest arranging the hunger strike outcomes into four categories; (1) 
concession, (2) surrender, (3) death and (4) forced end. This leads to the research question of 
this thesis: 
 
Research question: What determines hunger strike outcomes? 
 
My dependent variable is the immediate outcome of the hunger strikes. While acknowledging 
that the long-term effects of hunger strikes might be well as important to study, they are 
difficult to measure quantitatively. What makes hunger strikes interesting for comparative 
political science is that in every hunger strike, the government (it can also be other types of 
opponents) is put in a situation where it often is compelled to response. As with labor strikes, 
hunger strikes can be seen as sequences of interaction between challengers and opponents 
(Biggs, 2002). Hence, every hunger strike sequence is also an expression of the government’s 
response to protest. 
Most studies on social movements have used case or small-N studies, because of 
limitations of data or the complexity of the theoretical argument that follows studying 
unconventional politics (Amenta et al., 2010: 301).  Compared to most other protests tactics in 
contentious politics, hunger strikes have a finite time span and are relatively specific in their 
targets and aims, which makes them suitable for quantitative research. 
There are two main methodological challenges in dealing with hunger strikes. Firstly, 
non-democracies without freedom of speech or media censorship will more probably try to 
hide information from the public about hunger strikes, especially from what happens inside a 
prison, where they can more easily control the information. Secondly, certain outcomes of 
hunger strikes, for example when the hunger striker dies from starvation, is more likely to get 
media attention (Healy, 1982: 225). 
As a tactic of protest, hunger strikes here be analyzed the framework of social 
movements theory, and more specifically political process theory and opportunity structures. 
This thesis also follows the Tilly’s (1986) notion that the emergence of new protest tactics 
does not happen independently of basic power structures in the society. I will therefore trace 
the emergence of the first decade of hunger strikes and use the hunger strike dataset to find 
traces of patterns. 
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 Available data 1.2
The foundation for this thesis is a media based event dataset containing 1441 observed hunger 
strikes in all countries between 1906 and 2004, assembled from the New York Times, 
Keesing’s Worldwide Online, and The Economist, under the management of Stephen Scanlan 
(2008). For variables on political regimes, I will use the Polity IV index as a measure of 
democracy (Marshall and Gurr, 2012) and ACLP/DDs data on coalition governments 
(Cheibub et al., 2005). 
 My contribution 1.3
A quantitative analysis of hunger strikes have not been carried out before. Now it is made 
possible with an available quantitative dataset. Because this will be the first statistical analysis 
of its kind, it will to some extend be an exploratory thesis. In sociology, hunger strikes can be 
perceived as games between the hunger striker and the government, whereby a combination 
of different strategies and moves results in different outcomes (Biggs, 2007). In this thesis, I 
argue that hunger strikes are sequences of interactions between the protester and the 
government, whereby its outcomes depend on a combination of hunger strike-specific and 
political context-specific factors, in accordance with general principles of political process 
theory (McAdam, 1982). The theoretical framework will borrow elements from political 
opportunity structures and studies of protest movements, where the aim is to contribute to the 
prediction of where, when and how hunger strikes are most likely to reach their intended 
goals. 
 The structure 1.4
This content of the thesis is organized in the following way:  
Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework for how hunger strikes can be analyzed. 
Firstly, I attempt to define hunger strike and conceptualize the different hunger strike 
outcomes. Then, I review literature that can be relevant for explaining hunger strikes, 
primarily from the social movements tradition. Then, I will explore the hunger strike dataset 
in order to see patterns that can lead to assumptions about hunger strike outcomes. Finally, 
elements from this chapter will be synthetized into my hypotheses. 
Chapter 3 presents the research design for this thesis. Here, I present a short utline of 
my methodological approach. Then, I present my data, followed by some methodological 
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considerations on missing and incomplete data. At last, I present the statistical model and the 
strategy for how the analysis will be carried out.  
Chapter 4 presents the analysis of this thesis by going through my different models. 
The results will be thoroughly interpreted, followed by an evaluation of the hypothesis 
Chapter 5 presents a conclusion.
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 Theoretical framework 2
This chapter develops a theoretical framework for understanding and analyzing hunger 
strikes. My objective is first to define and understand the process of hunger strike and 
secondly to find which factors are relevant in order to measure and analyze hunger strikes and 
their outcomes. Existing research on hunger strike from a comparative political perspective is 
scarce. Lahiri (2014) who have done research on suicide protests is an exception. Therefore, 
it’s necessary to find existing research on other protest forms that can be adopted to hunger 
strikes. As this is a relative unexplored topic, and my hunger strike dataset has not been yet 
been analyzed statistically, I will spend some time exploring the dataset in search of patterns 
and trends. Lastly I will make some hypotheses based on literature and findings in the data set 
that will be tested in Chapter 4. 
 Defining hunger strike 2.1
Hunger strikes can take many shapes and forms. Is it possible to treat all kinds of hunger 
strikes as the same tactic? This section attempts to answer this question. A hunger strike can 
in simplest terms be defined as “a refusal to eat with the aim of forcing the opponent to grant 
certain demands…” (Sharp, 1973: 363). In this thesis I aim to analyze hunger strikes 
outcomes as a political protest tactic. With this definition I risk including actions without 
political motivation. I therefore find it more useful to follow the definition of Scanlan et al. 
(2008: 278) which calls a hunger striker someone who “…voluntarily refuses to consume the 
food or nourishment necessary to sustain life as a socio-political protest tactic...”. I here 
follow the definition of protest made by Della Porta and Diani (2006: 165) as “nonroutinized 
ways of affecting political, social, and cultural processes”.  
An intuitive way to explain hunger strikes is by the comparison to hostage-taking or 
kidnapping. The essence of hostage taking is that A threatens to kill victim B in order to force 
concessions from the target C (C can also sometimes be the target). Paradoxically, in hunger 
strike A is also the victim as the hunger striker only threatens to harm himself (Biggs, 2007: 
2).  
There’s many categories in which hunger strikes can be put in. Within the framework 
of contentious politics, hunger strike fit well as an example of a disruption. According to  
Sidney Tarrow (2011: 101-102), a disruption: “…obstructs the routine activities of opponents, 
bystanders, or authorities and forced them to attend to protesters’ demands”. 
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Within the category “political self-sacrifice” (Fierke, 2013) several aspects of hunger strikes 
are the same as “suicide protest” and “self-immolations” (Biggs, 2012) or what Huey Newton 
(1973) called “revolutionary suicide”. But an important difference is that while these tactics 
aims towards martyrdom and political symbolism, hunger strikes first and foremost aims to 
produce bargaining resources, as formulated by Lipsky (1970: 2). This was pointed out by a 
Jesuit theologian P.J. Gannon (1920), who was discussing the moral aspect of hunger strikes, 
following the death of Irish hunger striker Terrence MacSwiney: 
 
…no hungerstriker aims at death. Quite the contrary; he desires to live. He aims at 
escaping from unjust detention, and, to do this is willing to run the risk of death, of 
which he has no desire, not even as a means. His object is to bring the pressure of 
public opinion to bear upon an unjust aggressor to secure his release, and advance a 
cause for which he might face certain death in the field. There is nothing here of the 
mentality of suicide, whose object is to escape from a life that has grown hateful to 
him (Gannon, 1920: 450). 
 
The point has also been echoed by other hunger strikers in efforts to make clear their 
intentions, as here formulated in the 1989 Tiananmen Square Hunger Strike Declaration: “We 
are not in search of death; we are looking for real life” (Xiaobo et al., 1989: 148). The 
communicative aspect of hunger strikes is captures by what Biggs (2003) calls 
“communicative suffering”. The theatrical aspect of hunger strike has been made in analysis 
of the Chinese student hunger strikes in 1989 (Esherick and Wasserstrom, 1990) and the 
Turkish hunger strike in 2000 (Anderson, 2010). And just as terrorist groups needs to make 
clear their responsibility (and sometime demands) following their actions, hunger strikers 
need to manifest their demands in a declaration (Scanlan et al., 2008: 279). 
Hunger strikes are ambiguous when it comes to violence (Lahiri, 2014: 6-7). Although 
hunger strikes are portrayed as non-violent action (Scanlan et al., 2008, Sharp, 1973), it can 
also be labelled as political violence when applying William Gamson’s (1975: 74) definition 
of violence: “deliberate physical injury to property of persons” and include violence directed 
against oneself. Lahiri (2014: 28) argues that it is this duality between violence and non-
violence that makes hunger strikes effective. 
 Different kinds of hunger strikes? 2.1.1
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One can separate hunger strikes into two main strategies, which often comes to light in the 
hunger strikers declarations. Hunger strikers may either declare that they are striking at a 
finite time span, or that they will keep on until demands are met, also called open-ended 
hunger strikes. Lahiri (2014: 140) chooses to differentiate between “suicide protests” whereby 
the actor intends to die, and “hunger strikes” that have finite time spans. Whether the person 
dies or not is not important in her definition, because they can be stopped. In medicine, a 
similar differentiation is found, where open-ended strikes are often labeled as "voluntary total 
fasting” (Altun et al., 2004: 35), while temporary strikes are labeled as “voluntary protest 
fasting” (Reyes, 2007: 703). Yet, to apply these labels to hunger strikes is not straightforward. 
Not all hunger strikers are clear about their intended length. Hunger strikers may also change 
their strategy on the way. It is generally difficult to know the true intentions of a hunger 
striker, and if s/he actually is willing to die. Pretending to have this willingness is a part of the 
strategic game between the hunger strike and the target, which will be discussed later in this 
chapter, in Section 2.2.2. I choose not to differentiate hunger strikes according to the 
mentioned categories and therefore include both limited and open-ended of hunger strike in 
my analysis. 
Do all hunger strikers have the same set of rules on how to conduct the hunger strike? 
Not all, but most follow the line of only drinking water. Often, the water can be added salt and 
vitamins. There are a few cases where hunger strikers stretch these rules and allow limited 
nourishment in order to buy more time, one example being the Turkish hunger strikers in 
2001 which lasted up to three years (Anderson, 2004: 837-838, Reyes, 2007: 704). Going the 
other direction, hunger strikers may also abstain from water, but there’s only a few cases 
where this has happened. One known example is the hunger strike by then IRA chief of staff 
Sean McCaughey in 1946 that decided to escalate the hunger strike by rejected water on his 
last days and consequently died after only 22 days (Beresford 1987: 20). 
Being an important subcategory of hunger strikes, prisoners’ hunger strikes make out 
about 70% of their hunger strikes dataset, according to Scanlan et al. (2008). While there are 
some evident differences between hunger striking in prison and in the open, Biggs (2007: 4) 
argues that the principles of the dynamic interaction between the hunger striker and the 
government applies equally outside as to inside prisons. 
Another important question is whether hunger strikes should be labelled as individual or 
collective acts. This has consequences for what kind of literature we regard as relevant for 
understanding these acts. Large scale hunger strikes are easy to label as collective action, but 
what about individual hunger strikes? It is not merely a quantitative matter. An individual 
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hunger striker may act as a vanguard of a large movement. A spontaneous individual hunger 
strike may also mobilize people or movements to support a cause. A related question is 
whether the motivation of the hunger striker is personal or political. This differentiation can 
also be difficult in practice, especially when it comes to prisoners hunger strikes. Mahatma 
Ghandi, for example, disapproved of prisoners hunger strikes because they were, in his eyes, 
motivated by personal benefits (Lahiri, 2014: 28). Lahiri (2014: 140) suggests drawing a line 
between protesters that have openly stated goals and those that have not, as an indication of 
whether the motivation is political or personal. Accordingly, to have openly stated goals 
implies that the protester can be analyzed within the larger framework of social movements 
and collective action. I choose to follow this line in my thesis. In addition, as my aim is to 
analyze hunger strikes outcomes as results of  interactions between the hunger striker and the 
government, I will limit my analysis to hunger strikes that has a level of government, or 
governmental institution, as targets. This will exclude hunger strikes which has for example 
private companies, private religious institutions or private individuals as their target. 
 Emergence of hunger strikes as tactic 2.1.2
According to Tarrow (2011: 116), new innovations in tactical repertoires of protest happen as 
results of interactions between the challengers and their opponents. This section looks at the 
innovation of hunger strikes as a political tactic and how the first decade of interactions 
between hunger strikers and their opponents shaped the tactic. 
Documented cases of political hunger strikes are difficult to find earlier than the end 
of the 19
th
 century, at least in Western literature. While the proclaimed pioneers of modern 
hunger strikes are the Suffragettes on England and United States and Irish republican 
prisoners (Lahiri, 2014: 18), they were initially inspired by Russian revolutionaries who went 
on hunger strikes in Siberian jails under the Tsarist regime (Deutsch, 1977). People in Britain 
had learned about Russian hunger strikes in Siberian jails through press articles and memoirs 
of Russian dissidents during the 1880s. It was especially after a hunger strike by four Russian 
women in Siberian prison “Irkutsk” that the British Suffragettes took interest in the “Russian 
strategy” (Kennan, 1889: 502-511). While British MPs at that time were harshly criticizing 
Russian authorities because of their neglect of hunger strikers, the Suffragettes saw this a 
good strategy to gain sympathy among British people applying the same tactic.  
When Suffragette Marion Dunlop started her hunger strike in 1909, it was the first 
known political fast in the British empire (Vernon, 2007: 43). The Suffragettes adopted a tool 
that before had been identified with Russian masculinity and strength, and made it into a their 
10 
 
own tool (Vernon, 2007: 61). They also exploited the fact that British media had criticized the 
Tsar regime for the treatment of Russian hunger strikers (Grant, 2006: 248-252). 
The British home secretary Herbert Gladstone authorized force-feeding in late 
September 1909 to be used against Suffragette member Mary Leigh. It sparked a tempered 
debate on its legality. Less than six months later, new home secretary Winston Churchill 
conceded to their demands and made special privileges for Suffragette prisoners. Rule 243a 
allowed suffrages the privilege of political prisoners, without affording them political status. 
And it did not apply to male suffrage-rights protesters, who continued their hunger strike. The 
next home secretary Reginald McKenna then removed the privileges and prompted new 
hunger strikes that was met with reintroduction of force feeding. He then retreated and 
introduced the cat and mouse-tactic, also called “Prisoners (temporary discharge for Ill-
Health) Act” in April 1913. It was designed to replace force feeding by temporary releasing 
prisoners until they regained their health, and then re-arresting them. Within six months, the 
tactic collapsed because the released committed new offences and the police failed to re-arrest 
them (Vernon, 2007: 65). 
Forcible feeding was not a new phenomenon, it was earlier used against 
institutionalized children and people believed to have mental illnesses. Nonetheless, its use 
was contested within medical circles. A debate in the medical journal The Lancet in the 1870s 
following a series of failed force feedings was picked up and used actively by the Suffragettes 
to contend the government’s one-sided legitimation of force feeding as a merciful and 
necessary act (Vernon, 2007: 76). The debate over the legitimacy of force feeding 
concentrated on whether how dangerous and painful it was and whether it was preferable to 
apply force-feeding through nose or mouth (Anderson Moxey, 1872). The Suffragettes’ 
neighbors and counterparts in Ireland started using hunger strikes in 1912 when the arrested 
suffrage activist Lizzie Barker was denied political status. Within two years, 22 fellow 
Suffragettes in Ireland went on a hunger strikes.  
The same year as Dunlop’s hunger strike, Mahatma Gandhi visited the Suffragettes 
movement in London and learned about their tactic. Gandhi did first praise the Suffragettes, 
but later distanced himself from what he described as too militant and violent (Vernon, 2007: 
70). He also distinguished between what he labelled “ethical fasts” and “political hunger 
strikes”, and did, as mentioned, not approve of the latter which he labeled as selfish (Lahiri, 
2014: 28). Having been mostly used by women in Britain and Ireland, it was by many 
classified as a feminine tactic. (Owens, 1984: 63). From the start, the strategy of hunger 
strikes clearly rested on the notion of gaining sympathy. A necessity for this sympathy was 
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the relatively new humanitarian notion among citizens that starving to death was both 
unnatural, immoral and inhumane. One can therefore argue that it’s not coincidental that 
women, the first object of humanitarian sympathy, were the first to use it (Vernon, 2007: 64). 
The image of hunger strikes as a “womanish” tactic would gradually change. While a few 
men in support of the British Suffragettes had already been on hunger strikes, the first well 
known male hunger striker was the Irish republican and socialist leader James Connolly in 
1913. But still then, republican leaders like Eamon de Valera expressed ambivalence to 
Connolly’s tactic (Vernon, 2007: 62). In 1917, Irish republican Thomas Ashe died after a 
failed attempt to force-feed him during a hunger strike. The funeral was attended by over 
30 000 (Beresford, 1987: 17). This led to a more conciliatory line from the British 
government. So when the Lord Major of Cork and commander of the Irish Republican Army, 
Terence MacSwiney, went on a hunger strike three years later, it was with the knowledge that 
the British government had conceded to every hunger strike since Ashe’s death (Vernon, 
2007: 68). MacSwiney therefore raised the stakes and did not only demand political status, 
like his predecessors, but also recognition of the Irish republic and constitutional authority of 
the provisional government established in 1919. Three days before his arrest, the British 
government had passed the “Coercion Act” and now wanted to show strength. British 
authorities did not want to use force feeding after what happened with Ashe, and did not put 
any effort in preventing MacSwiney’s death from hunger striking in 74 days. This sparked a 
huge unrest and later inspired 8000 anti-treaty prisoners to carry out a mass hunger strike in 
1923 in Irish prisons (Beresford, 1987: 17-19).
2
 Hunger strikes was now first and foremost 
associated with Irish republicanism. 
Proven to be an effective tool against British authorities, it soon spread to India and 
Ireland. The duality of the British empire, whilst being both a democracy with somewhat 
responsive politicians and being a colonial power ruling with the foundation of violence, was 
to be its Achilles’ heel according to the strategy of hunger strikes. Facing hunger strikes in 
three different territories, the British government was keen to establish a guideline on how to 
respond to hunger strikes everywhere in the empire. The dilemma was whether prison 
authorities should (A) use force feeding, (B) release the prisoner, or (C) let the prisoner die by 
starvation. All three options had been tried and experienced earlier in different contexts with 
more or less devastating consequences (Grant, 2006: 262-267). There were several challenges 
in creating a single guideline. Most hunger strikers had similar motives, namely to expose the 
                                                 
2
 Anti-treaty prisoners refers to those fighting against the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 that led to the establishment 
of the republic of Ireland in only the southern part of Ireland. 
12 
 
British system as inhumane and unjust and create sympathetic awareness about their case. But 
hunger strikes was carried out in different manners, different principles and sometimes 
different goals (Vernon, 2007). 
In more recent times, Irish and Indian traditional culture have been emphasized as 
important reasons for their frequent use of hunger strikes (Grant, 2006: 247, Vernon, 2007: 
60). Examples of this framing can be found in scholars like Fierke (2013: 108-117) and 
secondary literature as Beresford (1987: 14-15). Evidence is found in Irish pre-Christian 
culture, whereby the Senchus Mor (civil code) allowed for a practice called Troscad (fasting 
on or against a person) and Cealachan (achieving justice by starvation). Similarly, an ancient 
Indian practice called sitting Dharna allows fasting till death on someone’s doorstep, a 
practice that was abolished by the British colonial powers by government decree in 1860. 
Gandhi have allegedly found inspiration in Indian traditions when he justified and rationalized 
hunger strikes. Similarly, figures as Terrence MacSwiney found legitimacy in Irish traditions 
in his polemics against those priests who at the time labeled hunger strike as illegitimate 
suicide. When hunger strikes are presented results of ancient traditions, it is important to 
remember that actors needed to root their tactics in their culture in order to not alienate 
themselves from the public. Tilly (1978: 156) reminds us that a society’s tactical repertoire of 
protest is relatively small and definite, and changes slowly. A protest tactic not rooted in 
society will therefore have smaller changes of succeeding. In this perspective, trying to find 
roots in one’s culture to familiarize a new tactic seems rational. Fasts can be found in Hindu, 
Christian and Muslim religion (Lahiri, 2014: 18). It should therefore not be difficult to find 
traditions that can legitimize use of hunger strike if needed. As Vernon (2007: 60) points out: 
“…in each context the hunger strike was adopted to a particular set of political conditions and 
given an appropriate historical genealogy that heightened its purchase as a form of protest”.  
 To sum up this section, I have illustrated what were the important elements in the 
innovation of the hunger strike tactic. The presence of a level of democracy, open media and 
humanitarian and sympathetic attitudes amongst people were important for the tactic to work. 
Furthermore, globalized media facilitated a fast spread of the tactic to other continents. 
 Conceptualizing hunger strike outcomes 2.2
 Studying success or outcomes? 2.2.1
Scholars of social movements have been mostly preoccupied with the question of success and 
less with outcomes (Giugni, 1999). There are several methodological and theoretical problems 
with studying success (Amenta and Young, 1999, Giugni, 1998). The causality between a 
13 
 
social movement and a policy shift is difficult to measure (Giugni, 1999, Gamson, 1975). 
Political achievements may happen as a result of unintentional actions or by-products of 
intentional actions (Tilly, 1978: 85). And political achievements may take time: A social 
movement may fail initially to accomplish all its goals, but manage to lay the necessary 
organizational or ideological foundations needed for its predecessors to be successful some 
generations later (Gamson, 1975: 28). When it comes to the tactic of hunger strikes, this may 
be one of many used by a social movement in pursuit of a policy change. In this case it will be 
difficult to isolate the effect of one tactic and evaluate its success.  
Another problem is that there could be other measures of success than the fulfillment 
of the political goals of the protesters. The Irish hunger strike of 1981 in the north of Ireland 
serves as a good example of this. The hunger strikers did not get any concessions and ten 
hunger strikers eventually died.
3
 The hunger strike that in sum lasted in eight months, caused 
a radicalization within the Irish nationalist movement not president since the 1916 Easter 
rising. The support for prisoners was illustrated by the 100 000 attending Bobby Sands’ 
funeral. It further materialized in an electoral victory for the Sinn Fain and its entry to Irish 
politics in the North (Moloney, 2002: 214-5). The result of the hunger strike was described as 
“an almost volcanic upsurge in popular support for the Republican Movement”, and that this 
was an “unplanned by-product of the hunger strikes” (O'Brien, 1999: 124). 
Instead of success, Gamson (1975: 28) proposes an evaluation based on: “a set of 
outcomes, recognizing that a given challenging group may receive different scores on equally 
valid, different measures of outcome”. This supports the use of a more differentiated measure 
than success.  
 Four hunger strike outcomes 2.2.2
The dependent variable in this thesis is the outcome of the hunger strike. In a study of the 
wave of Irish republican hunger striking prisoners between 1916-1923, sociologist Michael 
Biggs (2007: 4) analyses them from a rationalist perspective and see each hunger strike as a 
game using game theory. He identified concession, surrender, death and “no hunger strike”, 
as possible outcomes. The last was added outcome because he also included prisoners who 
didn’t go on hunger strike. Although his research only studies hunger striking prisoners, he 
argues that the principle logic of hunger strikes as a game between protester and government 
applies equally to hunger strikes outside prison (Biggs, 2007: 4). 
                                                 
3
 The actual willingness of the British government to concede, and to what extent proposed concessions were 
turned down by the IRA has been disputed. See O’Rawe (2011).  
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In his model, he identifies three types of hunger strikers: (h1) bluffing, (h2) resolute 
and (p3) sacrificial. He identified two types of government, (g1) conciliatory and (g2) 
intransigent. 
I have refined this model to consist of the following four hunger strike outcomes: (1) 
concession, which means that the hunger strike it is called off by the striker after gaining 
concessions, (2) surrender, which means it is called off by hunger striker without 
concessions, (3) death, which is death by starvation and (4) forced end, whereby the 
government ends the strike using force. For the purpose of illustrating the different types of 
prisoners and governments that produces the different outcomes, I’ve identified two types of 
hunger strikers: (h1) bluffing and (h2) sacrificial, as well as three types of governments: (g1) 
conciliatory (g2) intransigent and tolerant (g3) intransigent and repressive. This is illustrated 
in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Four possible outcomes of a hunger strike: 
  Government 
  
conciliatory 
intransigent and 
tolerant 
intransigent and 
repressive 
 
Hunger 
striker 
bluffing CONCESSION SURRENDER SURRENDER 
sacrificial CONCESSION DEATH FORCED END 
 
I find support for the use of three types of governments in the approach by Tilly (1978: 98-
138) where he identified the three types of government response to protest, namely (1) 
facilitation, (2) toleration and (3) repression. 
 To further illustrate the difference of the outcomes for the actors, Table 2.2, also 
derived from Biggs (2007: 22) shows the pay-off functions for hunger striker and 
government. 
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Table 2.2: Pay-off functions for hunger striker and government 
 
As Table 2.2 illustrates, a hunger striker will try to maximize gains and reduce losses, while 
the government only strives to reduce its loss. The main difference between a bluffing and 
sacrificial hunger striker is how they conceive surrender and death. A sacrificial hunger 
striker that eventually surrenders has lost everything, including reputation. This hunger striker 
rather chooses death and will be awarded for it. However, for a hunger striker a concession is 
always preferable to death (Gannon, 1920: 450). A concession not only gives the hunger 
striker some sort of benefit, this also allows the hunger striker to close the hunger strike with 
her/his honor unharmed. A bluffer, on the other hand, will surrender the hunger strike rather 
than die of starvation, when its apparent that the government is not willing to give 
concessions and the health of the hunger striker is deteriorating (Biggs, 2007: 4-7). The 
government has more options than the hunger striker. For all governments, surrender is the 
outcome that reduces its cost to a minimum. The conciliatory government prefers concession 
to death. Both versions of intransigent governments refuse to concede, but the intransigent 
and repressive governments rather choose using force to stop the hunger strike and pre-empt 
death and possible martyrdom. If hunger striker is sacrificial and government is repressive, 
government will force the hunger strike to end. The most common means in prisons is 
forcible feeding. Some regimes also apply increased prison sentences, physical force, or 
imprisonment when it happens outside the prison. Today force-feeding is a common used tool 
used by governments to stop hunger striking prisoners, including in Europe (Jacobs, 2012). 
 Social movements theory 2.3
As discussed in Section 2.1.1, a hunger strike can, without regard to size, be considered as a 
political protest when the hunger striker has openly stated goals and targets a form of 
government. Analysis of political protest is mainly associated with the social movement 
Outcome 
 
Hunger striker 
 
Government 
  
Bluffing Sacrificial  Conciliatory 
Intransigent 
and tolerant 
Intransigent 
and repressive 
Concession  2 2  -2 -3 -3 
Surrender  -1 -2  -1 -1 -1 
Death  -2 1  -3 -2 -2 
Forced end  -1 -1  -3 -3 -2 
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tradition in political science. Before going through the literature relevant for explaining 
hunger strikes, it is useful to get an overview of the field of social movement studies. This 
section will therefore present a brief summary of its respective subfields and the background 
of their origins. That will lead us into Section 2.4 where I eventually present the literature 
relevant to explain hunger strike outcomes.   
 Classical theory 2.3.1
The earliest approaches to social movements orientated around the psychological perspective. 
In “The crowd: a study of the popular mind”, Gustav le Bon Le Bon (2001 [1896]: 18) 
described collective action as irrational and described protesters as individuals who had lost 
their consciousness to the crowd (Le Bon, 2001: 18). Classical theory consists of various sub-
theories, among them: mass society, collective behavior, status inconsistency, and relative 
deprivation. The common feature in this broad set of theories is the conception that social 
strain causes an undesirable psychological state that subsequently causes extreme behavior 
and support for social movements (McAdam, 1982: Ch. 1). Scholars within the mass society 
tradition believed that the weakening of traditional institutions was a necessary condition for 
the existence of social movements (Kornhauser, 1960: 177). Relative deprivation theory is 
another example of classical social movement theories. Ted R. Gurr (1970) laid the 
foundation for this theory with his book “Why men rebel”. He argued that political violence 
stemmed from relative deprivation, which he defined as the discrepancy between people’s 
value expectations and value capabilities (Gurr, 1970: 12-13). Until the 1960s, collective 
action was seen as “apolitical behavior” (McAdam, 1982: 2), and described by scholars as 
crowds, panics and manias (Della Porta and Diani, 2006: 11). Classic theories was gradually 
marginalized following the new social movements cycle of the 1960s (Tarrow, 2011: 23) and 
has since then been mostly criticized (Dalton et al., 2009). 
 Rational choice and resource mobilization 2.3.2
The rational choice theory, mainly established by Mancur Olson (1971), shifted the attention 
toward the incentives for participating in collective action. It questioned the classical 
perception that deprivation automatically caused protest, and believed that actors didn’t 
participate if they didn’t gain anything personally. In this context, the “free-rider problem” 
explains that if benefits are distributed collectively, individuals will have little incentives to 
participate because they will get their benefits anyway. The larger the group, the stronger the 
free-rider effect.  
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The sociologists McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977) found an answer to Olson’s 
collective action problem by emphasizing on organizations’ abilities to mobilize resources for 
its supporters (Tarrow, 2011: 24-25). Resource mobilization theory has been considered 
groundbreaking on the part that it defined social movements as conscious actors (Della Porta 
and Diani, 2006: 15). This model contributed to the shift in attention from “why” to “how” 
people engage in protest. Yet, the models’ emphasis on organization was a contradiction to 
the fact that many of the emerging movements of the 1960s and 1970s lacked formal 
organization (Tarrow, 2011: 24). 
 Political opportunity structures 2.3.3
The concept political opportunity structures (POS) was first conceptualized by Tilly (1978) as 
a set of constrains and incentives for protest mobilization. Some of the same principles had 
already been presented by Eisinger (1973) in his comparison of protests in American cities. 
His study showed that the frequency of protest mobilization took form as U-shaped curve 
whereby protest was least frequent where there were large degree of openness and where 
there were not openness at all. Tarrow (1998: 19-20) defines POS as “…consistent – but not 
necessary formal, permanent, or national – dimensions of the political struggle that encourage 
people to engage in contentious politics”. In one sense, the principles of opportunity structures 
could be traced back to Alexis de Tocqueville (2006 [1835-1840]), who in his famous 
comparison between France and United States, argued that the relative high level of state 
centralization in France was a constraining factor for the thriving of civil society. 
Accordingly, this lack of civil society to structure and channel peoples frustration contributed 
to the occurrence of the French revolution (Tarrow, 2011: 78-79).
4
  
McAdam (1982) eventually synthesized different dimensions of POS into a 
comprehensive theory named “political process”, but the terms political process and political 
opportunity structures are now being used interchangeably. In his research on black 
insurgency in the United States, he established a connection between institutionalized and 
unconventional politics. He followed the line of Gamson (1975: 138-139) who argued that all 
kinds of protests were no less important than conventional politics. One of Tilly’s (1986) 
main thesis’s claimed that the emergence and development of social movements was a result 
of an ongoing interaction with nation states. This caught the interest of several comparativists 
in political science, such as Kitschelt (1986), Kriesi et al. (1995) and Tarrow (1989). As 
                                                 
4
 This argument by Tocqueville has met criticism by Tarrow, who argues that the description French civil society 
is false (Tarrow, 2011: 77-80) and that Tocqueville’s methodology is poor (Tarrow, 2010).  
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evident from the definition above, POS is today conceived as a broad and somewhat 
ambiguous cluster of factors that is in some way or another constrains or encourage protest. In 
the most widely held conception of POS, summarized by McAdam et al. (1996: 10), POS 
consists of the following four elements: (1) the relative openness or closure of the political 
system, (2) divisions among the elites, (3) the presence of allies, and (4) the state’s capacity 
and propensity for repression. 
POS has come under increasing criticism, mainly for what Sartori (1970) calls 
“conceptual stretching”, whereby a concept is widened to the extent that it no longer explains 
anything. As one of the main criticizers, Gamson and Meyer (1996: 275) warn that POS is: 
“…in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect of the social 
movement environment…”. Rootes (1999: 1) believes it is still useful as long as it’s being 
used only for explaining those elements of collective actions that are genuinely structural. 
 Explaining hunger strike outcomes 2.4
In the last section, I gave a brief summary of the main orientations within social movement 
scholarly tradition. It was not the intention to give a fair comparison, but rather to show how 
new fields of research have emerged as answers to former unanswered questions. It was also 
to show how the main fields of research on protest begun as a mere psychological field, then 
shifted to sociology, and at last as a synthesis of sociology and political science. For the 
purpose of this thesis, the approach of political opportunity structures appears favorable 
because it connects protest movements to the state and the political context.  
In this section I will present factors based on social movements theory that are 
relevant for analyzing hunger strikes outcomes. For reasons of clarity, I will separate between 
internal and external factors. First, I will present relevant factors related to the hunger strike. 
Secondly, I present relevant factors related to the political context. Especially the last section 
will concentrate on political opportunity structures, but other elements from the social 
movements tradition will also be considered.  
 Internal factors 2.4.1
Tactical repertoire 
Taylor and Van Dyke (2004: 278-283) recognizes some key elements of tactical repertoire 
that shape social movement outcomes: novelty, disruption, variety, size and cultural 
resonance. Lahiri (2014) has showed that tactical repertoire, or what she calls “tactical 
depth”, is a crucial factor for success in suicide protests. However, to include this factor in my 
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thesis would imply a broader analysis of the movements hunger strikers belonging to, which 
is too demanding. Since this thesis analysis a specific tactic, variety is left out as an element. 
I’m also leaving out cultural resonance as an element for the same reasons. In a quantitative 
thesis such as this, cultural differences would be practically difficult to measure. The 
following section therefore explores the elements novelty, militancy and size as possible 
factors explaining hunger strike outcomes. 
Disruption 
A disruption can be defined as a protest act that “break with routine, startle bystanders, and 
leave elites disoriented”  (Tarrow, 2011: 99). The effect of social movements use of 
disruptions is disputed within social movement theory. On one hand, early scholars have 
found a positive relationship between disruption and a desires outcome. As an example, 
Shorter and Tilly (1974) have found that the use of violence increases the chances of gaining 
successful outcomes in labor strikes. Gamson (1975) have argued that the more disruptive, the 
more likely is a social movement to succeed. Piven and Cloward (1979) argued that poor 
groups without access to the conventional channels of politics has to use disruption in order to 
gain anything. The logic is that a government facing a disruptive event will feel compelled to 
response rapidly, typically with either repression and/or concession (Andrews, 2001: 74). On 
the other hand, scholars such as Mansbridge (1986) have argued that radicalization scared off 
the moderate allies and thus marginalized the movement for the Equal Rights Amendment in 
the United States. A hunger strike in itself can be labelled as a disruptive event as defined 
above. But hunger strikes can also be more or less disruptive. Because the most disruptive 
scenario in hunger strikes is death, the closer a hunger strike reaches death, i.e. the longer a 
hunger strike lasts, the more disruptive impact it will have. 
Size 
The size of a protest is considered to be an important factor for movements’ abilities to both 
mobilize and to have an impact. Strength in numbers captures media attention, makes a 
movement more visual and signals its popular support (Taylor and Van Dyke, 2004: 281). 
When it comes to the relationship between protesters and government, scholars disagree on 
the consequence of size. Taylor and Van Dyke (2004: 281) argues that size enhances the 
disruptive potential of a protest by making it more difficult for the government to repress it. 
Inversely, Tilly (1978: 111-112) argues that the larger the scale of a collective action, the 
more repression a government is likely to use against it. Indications of scale can be number of 
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participants, duration, geographic range, extent of organization, degree of force mobilized or 
some weighted combination of them.  
Novelty and innovation 
Several scholars suggest that protesters’ ability to surprise their opponent is important for the 
impact. McAdam (1983) showed that the civil rights movements’ use of “sit-ins“ proved 
powerful because it caught the authorities off-guard. As mentioned in Section 2.1.2,  
Tarrow (2011: 116) holds that the interaction between challengers and their opponents is what 
creates new innovation in tactical repertoire. When governments find ways to restrain the 
protesters, they are forced to find new ways to reclaim the momentum. According to Tilly 
(1978: 156), the protest repertoire of a population generally only includes a handful of tactics, 
and the repertoire changes slowly and are conditioned by time, place and traditions. In feudal 
Europe, means of protest were local and often concerned with bread, belief, land and death 
(Tarrow, 2011: 42). Analysis of 19
th
 century France shows how public meetings, 
demonstrations, strikes and occupations became part of the repertoire as a result of the 
centralization of the French state. Previous opponents like landlords, priests and other local 
authorities lost their importance and the old forms of protest directed towards them no longer 
were effective (Tilly, 1986: 308-312). When new forms of protest were put in motion they 
proved effective, but also gradually lost novelty as they became familiar and predictable to the 
authorities. Shorter and Tilly (1974: 52) shows how this can happen with the example of  
labor strikes in France between 1830 and 1960. They revealed a routinization of the strikes 
whereby the strikes “…passed from being small-scale, intense, unusual occurrences to large-
scale calculated everyday events”, which were also much more predictable to their opponents.  
That said, routinization of protest have also proved successful for social movements in cases 
where protest activities have managed to be transformed into conventional politics (Andrews, 
2001).  
 External factors 2.4.2
Here, I present the external factors relevant for understanding hunger strike outcomes. These 
factors are mainly based on political opportunity structures, which, as mentioned in Section 
2.3.3, includes the following four key elements: (1) the relative openness or closure of the 
political system, (2) divisions among the elites, (3) the presence of allies, and (4) the state’s 
capacity and propensity for repression. Because of the limitations in my data material on the 
presence of allies and repression, I will not consider these two element here.  
Regime openness and strength 
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Political opportunity structures hold that regime openness is a central factor for protest 
mobilization and the chances of desired outcomes. Kitschelt (1986) identified two structures: 
“political input” defined the state’s ability to be influenced, while “political output” defined 
its ability to implement changes. A regime’s input structure was either open or closed, while 
its output structure was either weak or strong. With the example of anti-nuclear movements in 
four different countries, Kitschelt showed that the context of a strong and open regime was 
the most favorable for social movements.  
In a comparative study of suicide protests, Lahiri (2014) finds that hunger strikes and 
suicide bombings share some factors that determine their outcomes. While suicide bombings 
never can be labelled as non-violence and hunger strikes can, they both use a form of 
emotional blackmail in order to coerce their opponent into granting them concessions. And 
they both make the perpetrator into the victim of his own act. A broad study of suicide 
bombings shows that it this tactic is much more likely to be carried out in non-democracies 
(Pape, 2005: 44). He explains this because (1) democracies are perceived as more vulnerable 
because the authorities are more easily influenced, (2) democracies are perceived as less 
likely to assert repression, (3) suicide missions are more difficult to organize and publicize in 
a non-democracy.  
Divisions among the elite 
Another central element of political opportunity structures is the notion that divisions among 
the elites creates opportunities. Tarrow (2011: 165) argues that in democracies this can be 
measured by electoral stability. New electoral coalitions will create uncertainty among their 
supporters, and force authorities to maximize their standing by appealing to the public. Piven 
and Cloward (1979) shows how realignment of American voters created opportunities for 
poor people’s movements. A political crises that weakens the regime’s capacity to control the 
population has often been a catalyst for revolutions (Skocpol, 1979: Ch. 2). A paradox often 
seen in regimes in crises is that their attempt to reach out their hand to the opposition only 
contributes to the hastening of their collapse. One of the earliest articulations of this principle 
was made by Alexis de Tocqueville: “…the most critical moment for bad governments is the 
one which witnesses their first steps toward reform” (Tocqueville, 1856: 214). Similarly, 
divisions among the elites is often seen as an opportunity for challengers (Tarrow, 2011: 166). 
Tarrow (2011: 5) uses Israel’s attack on the Turkish solidarity ship “Mavi Marmara” in 2010 
as an example of how a weak government (a broad and divided party coalition) can act 
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disproportionally repressive, and hence unwisely, given the opportunities it created for its 
opponents’ social movements. 
Learning process  
In addition to the elements of opportunity structures, I propose to bring on a somewhat 
ignored factor in social movements, namely the learning process. It has been claimed that in 
the game of hunger strikes, both government and hunger striker will gradually adopt 
experiences and learn from them (Biggs, 2007). Charles Brockett (1991: 262) argues that 
tradition applies in equal weight for challengers: “Challengers are also constrained by these 
historical traditions. Challengers not only respond to current regime actions, but also must 
anticipate future actions, calculations that in turn are based on memories and stories of past 
elite behavior”, and, furthermore, “the memory of past repression is part of the calculation of 
the risks involved in collective action contemplated in the present” (Brockett, 1991: 263).   
 Trends and patterns 2.5
It’s useful to take a closer look at the hunger strike dataset (Scanlan et al., 2008) in order to 
see whether there are some developments. These developments can be useful for 
understanding which factors hunger strikes outcomes are influenced by. Figure 2.1 shows the 
distribution of hunger strike outcomes according to my operationalization with the four 
possible outcomes distributed on years between 1906 and 2004. 
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Figure 2.1: Area plot of hunger strike outcomes across years 
 
It shows that death and “forced end” were much more frequent outcomes during the first three 
decades of the 20
th
 century compared to now. One explanation behind this may be explained 
by Healy (1982: 225) who argues that media tends to overemphasize extreme outcomes such 
as death. Considering that access to media was more limited in this period, its reason to 
believe that less newsworthy outcomes as surrender and concessions did not reach the 
headlines. Another explanation could be that hunger strikes at this time were still an 
unordinary and extreme tactic only applied by those in utterly desperate situations that also in 
most cases were willing to die for their cause. Along with the familiarization of the tactic 
during the three first decades, the threshold for carrying out a hunger strike has probably been 
lowered. Death is both the most rare and most stable outcome over time, while surrender is 
the least stable amongst the outcomes. The percentage of hunger strikes that ended with 
concession had its first peak in the late 1930s and then the second and largest peak in late 
1980s. Both peaks followed high numbers of deaths and forced end. The second peak of 
concessions clearly follows a peak of forced end and death. It therefore seems that trends 
concerning the outcomes concession, death and forced end are connected in a way that 
surrender is not.  
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It is tempting to draw a conclusion about the regime’s  capacity to learn. When 
governments experience death and forced end it can be costly. It seems that in periods with 
cycles of costly hunger strikes, governments gets more conciliatory and more likely to 
concede to a hunger striker. 
Figure 2.2 shows the frequency of hunger strikes reported between 1906 and 2004. 
Note that the darkest line shows only those reported hunger strikes whose outcomes have 
been identified (N = 608), which is the basis for Figure 2.1. The lighter line shows the total 
number of reported hunger strikes (N = 1441). This gives an impression of the amount of 
missing data in the dataset. 
Figure 2.2: Line plot of hunger strike frequency across years 
 
Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 combined shows that both peaks in concessions happened at the 
same time as a peak in reported hunger strikes in the world. This indicates that factors that 
increase hunger strike mobilization are the same factors that bring about concessions. Another 
possible interpretation is that successful hunger strikes itself mobilizes more people to go on 
hunger strikes for a period of time. 
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Table 2.3: Hunger strike frequency, median duration and median size 
Decade 
Hunger strike 
frequency 
Change  
(sd.
a
)  
Median 
duration 
Change 
 (sd.
a
)  
Median  
size 
Change  
(sd.
a
) 
1900
b
 3 -  10 -  1 - 
1910 11 +0,1  5 -0,6  8 +1,7 
1920 36 +0,2  24 +2,0  1 -1,7 
1930 86 +0,5  7 -1,8  1 +0,0 
1940 56 -0,4  6 -0,2  7 +1,4 
1950 86 +0,2  7 +0,1  4 -0,8 
1960 261 +1,9  5 -0,2  5 +0,1 
1970 252 -0,2  14 +0,9  4 -0,1 
1980 330 +0,8  18 +0,4  5 +0,2 
1990 232 -1,2  14 -0,5  3 -0,5 
2000
c
 88 -1,7  14 0,0  2 -0,3 
NOTES:  
a
: Change (sd.) is the change standardized to the mean and standard deviation of the group.
 
b
: Dataset start year is 1906.  
c
: Dataset end year is 2004. 
 
 
Table 2.3 lists the changes in hunger strike frequency, median duration and median size 
across decades. Size is number of hunger strikers participating in each strike. Duration is 
number of days. As mentioned, the first two decades is less of an interest because of the very 
limited amount of data. This confirms that the hunger strike cycle of the late 1980s also 
experienced an increase in median hunger strike duration. The change in median duration 
forms a U-curve. The median size is more stable but the general trend is a gradual decrease 
since the second peak in 1940. 
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Figure 2.3: Area plot of hunger strike themes across years 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the categorization of why people went on hunger strike across years. The 
categories are derived from Scanlan et al. (2008) and is a categorization of originally 75 
different categories of motives for  starting the hunger strike. The categories are the 
following: (1) Prisons and the justice system, (2) Peace, war, and conflict, (3) Government 
and political reform, (4) Social inequality, (5) Labor, work and the economy, (6) Human 
rights and civil liberties, (7) Immigration and asylum, and (8) Student and educational 
concerns. It’s noticeable that some categories are broader than others. The categorization 
could probably have been done differently, but at least it gives a picture of the development. 
The category “Prison and the justice system” ranges from prisoner rights, due processes, 
arrests, charges and convictions. The category “Peace, war and conflict” ranges from nuclear 
and antiwar issues to over MIAs (missing in action). The category “Government and political 
reform” concerns democratization, elections and regime reform. “Social inequality” is a broad 
category concerning discrimination against minorities or marginalized such as women, 
homosexuals and blacks. “Labor, work and the economy” includes cases as land reform, 
austerity, fuel prices, global economy, hunger, aid, labor rights and wage disputes. “Human 
rights and civil liberties” includes hunger strikes over apartheid, amnesty, freedom of speech, 
censorships, bans and repression of opposition. “Immigration and asylum” includes cases of 
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refugee’s status, treatment and rights to asylum. “Student and educational concerns” includes 
students’ rights and educational reform. “Other issues” includes issues that are too infrequent 
to make up a category or so narrow that they don’t fit in the existing categories. These cases 
range from animal rights, art, drugs, pornography, religion, euthanasia and the environment.  
 “Prisons and the justice system” is the largest category, not unnaturally since about 
half of all hunger strikers are incarcerated. This also means that some hunger strikers behind 
bars are motivated by other reasons than their own situation, or just because their reason have 
been unclear. During the first decades, a large majority of hunger strikes were motivated by 
prison rights or their motives were unclear. The “unclear” category has decreased steadily and 
stabilized at around 5 % during the 1980s. This may just be due to the better quality of news 
articles more up to date. Another feasible explanation is that hunger strikers gradually have 
learned the necessity of communicating their demand clearly. According to this plot, motives 
for hunger striking have developed in a pluralist direction.   
In Table 2.4 I have correlated various aspects of hunger strikes. This gives a rough 
overview of which factors are correlated with the four outcomes, in addition to size, length 
and hunger strike frequency.  In order to lower the threshold for identifying possible factors, 
I’ve also marked the correlation coefficients at the 0.1 level. The table shows that there’s not 
any strong correlations. Among the strongest correlations we find multiple locations and size 
(0.38). This only means that when many people are involved in hunger strike, they also occur 
in multiple locations. There also a considerable negative correlation between size and length 
(-0.3). This also has an intuitive logic, whereby it’s difficult to mobilize large amounts of 
people and at the same time hold it for a long time.  
 The correlations also suggests that some categories of hunger strike tend to experience 
some outcomes more than others. Among the other noticeable correlations we see that the 
outcome concession is correlated with two factors, the two hunger strike motivations 
Immigration and asylum (0.14) and student and educational concerns (0.1). There’s some 
correlation between outcome surrender the motivations being social inequality (0.15) and 
peace, war and conflict (0.1). The outcome death is not correlated with any types of 
motivation  but is correlated with length (0.16) and hunger strike frequency (-0.13). The 
outcome forced end shows some correlation with the motivation Labor, work and economy 
(0.1), in addition to the variable length (0.1). 
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 Hypotheses 2.6
 Intensity 2.6.1
As we have seen in Section 2.4.1, the intensity of a protest have great importance for the 
shaping of the outcome. Accepting a broad definition of violence, it also includes hunger 
strike whereby violence is directed against the protester herself. The disruptive potential in 
hunger strike is substantial. The literature emphasizes disruption as a key element in 
achieving a positive outcome The intensity of a hunger strike can be measured in its length, its 
size and whether it occurs at multiple locations. I will go through these elements one by one. 
Because the threat of hunger strike lies in the risk of self-starvation, this threat will increase 
with the factor of time. The “slowness” of the hunger striker is therefore important because it: 
“…gives others a chance to meet the demands of the hunger striker” (Annas, 1982: 21).  
Following this, I firstly present two hypotheses that may seem self-evident, but that are yet 
worth testing as a start: 
 
H1: The longer a hunger strike lasts, the higher is the likelihood that the outcome is 
concession. 
H2: The longer a hunger strike lasts, the higher is the likelihood that the outcome is 
forced end. 
Another important aspect of the hunger strike intensity is the size. An analysis of the cycle of 
Irish hunger strikes of the 1920s shows that they had a slightly greater chance of gaining 
concessions when more people participated, because: 
 
[A] collective hunger strike may reduce the risk of each individual dying, because not 
all will have to die—and one death may suffice—before a conciliatory government 
realizes its mistake and offers a concession, or before the benefits of additional deaths 
cease to be positive, enabling the survivors to surrender with honor (Biggs, 2007: 19). 
 
The same logic applied in the 1981 Irish hunger strikes, when Bobby Sands, the appointed 
leader of the hunger strikers, used a “conveyor belt” strategy, whereby each hunger striker 
was added one by one with some day’s interval. This strategy ensured that there was always 
one “leading” hunger striker, namely the one who had lasted longest, regardless of how many 
had died. This “hierarchy” of hunger strikers made it more difficult to break out, prolonging 
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the collective hunger strike (Beresford, 1987, O'Malley, 2013). Therefore, we can conclude 
that having a large number of hunger strikers not only help to get attention to the hunger 
strike, but it can be a strength for the hunger strikers ability to prolong the strike and avoid 
surrender. This leads to the following three hypotheses: 
 
H3: The more participants that engage in a hunger strike, the higher is the likelihood 
that the outcome is concession. 
H4: The more participants that engage in a hunger strike, the higher is the likelihood 
that the outcome is concession. 
Another measurable factor of intensity is whether the strike is extended to several locations. 
 
H5: When a hunger strike is carried out in more than one location, the likelihood that 
the outcome is forced end is higher. 
 Motivation 2.6.2
The likelihood of gaining a state concession will always depend on the actual demand by the 
hunger striker. A tactical hunger striker will “calibrate” the demand according to the 
likelihood of getting a concession (Biggs, 2007: 4). As mentioned in Section 2.1.2 with the 
example of Terrence MacSwiney, being over-confident about one’s demands can have fatal 
consequences. Yet, this easy for us to evaluate almost a century afterwards. If I would try to 
classify organizations or their demands according to how radical or modest they are, I would 
bump into a range of problems (Gamson, 1975: Ch. 4). Another way of differentiating the 
demands is to divide them into categories according to their political themes and see the effect 
of hunger striking for different political motivations. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H6: The likelihood of the outcome being concession depend on the hunger strike’s 
type of political motivation. 
 Political context 2.6.3
Kitschelt (1986) showed that open and strong regimes are more favorable to social 
movements. The demands of hunger strikers varies, but most fit in the category of defensive 
demands, which Tilly (1978: 73) argues are created when: “…a threat from outside induces 
the members of a group to pool their resources to fight off the enemy”. This means that the 
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political output structure is not as important as the input structure. The regime openness factor 
is tested in democracies, but can it be applied on non-democracies as well?  From section 
2.6.3 we have seen that a regime’s strength or weakness is central element within the political 
opportunity structures. A coalition governments can in many cases me weaker than a single 
party government. The “weak government thesis” argues that the “larger the number of 
decision makers, the less each will internalize the cost that certain policy will impose on 
others” (De Haan et al., 1999: 164).  This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H7: A hunger strike is more likely to gain a concession in a country run by a coalition 
government than in a country run by a non-coalition government. 
The general assumption within political process approach is that the more regime openness, 
the more likely is it that protests will succeed. Regime openness as a political opportunity 
have mainly been explored  within democracies. Extending this factor, can the regime types 
democracy and non-democracies help determine protests outcomes? This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H8: A hunger strike is more likely to gain a concession in a country with a higher 
level of democracy. 
 Learning process 2.6.4
Are regimes able to learn from their prior experience dealing with hunger strikes? The hunger 
strikes against the British authorities in the 1910s and 1920s, as discussed in 2.1.3 shows that 
there was a dialectical relationship between the protesters and the government that was under 
constant development. 
Isn’t this what novelty, as discussed in 2.7.1, is all about? A protest tactic’s ability to 
shock the authorities will gradually diminish, as governments will learn how to react in order 
to minimize the cost.  In some cases, single hunger strikes have had so much impact that they 
have allegedly changed the behavior of other governments. In July 1980, two Palestinians, Ali 
Jaafari and Rasem Halaweh, died after being wrongly forcible fed in an Israeli jail, whereby 
food entering the trachea rather than the esophagus (Hiltermann, 1990: 109). It has been 
argued that this single event made forcible feeding to almost disappear for several years 
(Reyes, 2007: 705). When the Irish hunger strike in the Maze prison erupted in 1980, the 
British government had already decided to abstain from forcible feeding because of the 
tactic’s redolence of British brutality during the 1919-1921 conflict and could potentially 
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cause anger in today’s Ireland (Moloney, 2002: 206). In governments this experience may 
materialize in guidelines, manuals or resolutions, as the earlier mentioned British abolishment 
of forcible feeding. International organizations also play an important role in the normative 
level, establishing “soft laws”. Before 1991, doctors could only refer to the 1975 Tokyo 
declaration concerning torture (World Medical Association, 1975: 703, Reyes, 2007) In 1991, 
the World Medical Association for the first time issued a declaration of principles on how 
medical personnel should handle hunger strikes, stating that “Hunger strikers should be 
protected from coercive participation” (World Medical Association, 1991a). However, 
arbitrary terminology opened up for different interpretations and forcibly feeding was not 
mentioned explicitly. Instead, the term “artificial feeding”, which can both be voluntarily and 
forcible, was used. Finally, in 2006, a revised version stated that “Forcible feeding is never 
ethically acceptable” (World Medical Association, 1991b, Reyes, 2007). 
Do governments fear hunger strikes more in times when they happen more frequently? 
The Figure 2.1 and 2.2 in section 2.5 might indicate that. While Figure 2.2 shows that the 
peak of observed hunger strikes where in the 1980s, Figure 2.1 shows that around the same 
years, the percentage of hunger strikes ending in concessions were also the highest. 
 Table 2.2 tries to illustrate that deaths are the most unfavorable outcome in the eyes of 
many governments. This is also supported by Lahiri (2014: 12). Most optimally, death is 
avoided without having to use concessions or forced end, hence the outcome being 
“surrender”. In the example of Irish republican hunger strikes in 1916 to 1923, Biggs (2007: 
12-14) shows how the British governments’ experience with hunger strikes gradually 
materialized in a changed on position on the use of force. My assumption that countries learn 
from the experience of hunger strikes leads to two hypothesis:  
 
H9: The more hunger strikes a country has experienced, the higher is the likelihood of 
the outcome being concession. 
H10: The more hunger strikes a country has experienced, the smaller is the likelihood 
of the outcome being death. 
 Summary of the hypothesis 2.6.5
In quantitative research, an important constrain on process of making hypothesis is the 
limitations of the dataset. All my hypothesis are able to be measures using the hunger strike 
dataset and additional country data. With other data, the hypothesis could have looked 
33 
 
different. Table 2.5 summarized my hypothesis, where the ten hypotheses involves three of 
the outcomes: six involves concession, three involves forced end and one involves death. 
  
 
 
 
  
Table 2.5: Summary of the hypothesis: 
Factor Hypothesis 
Hunger strike intensity H1: The longer a hunger strike lasts, the higher is the likelihood that the 
outcome is concession. 
 H2:  The longer a hunger strike lasts, the higher is the likelihood that the 
outcome is forced end. 
 H3: The more participants that engage in a hunger strike, the higher is the 
likelihood that the outcome is concession. 
 H4:  The more participants that engage in a hunger strike, the higher is the 
likelihood that the outcome is concession. 
 H5: When a hunger strike is carried out in more than one location, the 
likelihood that the outcome is forced end is higher. 
Hunger strike 
motivation 
H6: The likelihood of the outcome being concession depend on the hunger 
strike’s type of political motivation. 
Political context H7: A hunger strike is more likely to gain a concession in a country run by 
a coalition government than in a country run by a non-coalition 
government.  
 H8: A hunger strike is more likely to gain a concession in a country with a 
higher level of democracy. 
Experience with 
hunger strike 
H9: The more hunger strikes a country has experienced, the higher is the 
likelihood of the outcome being concession. 
 H10: The more hunger strikes a country has experienced, the smaller is the 
likelihood of the outcome being death. 
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 Research design 3
This chapter develops the research design for this thesis. I will begin with a short outline of 
my methodological approach. Then, I present my data, followed by some methodological 
considerations on missing and incomplete data. At last, I present the statistical model and the 
strategy for how the analysis will be carried out. 
 A quantitative approach 3.1
As argued by Skocpol (2003), social scientists do not only deal with real world phenomenon, 
but are also engaged in a continuous debate over methods and frameworks, what she calls the 
“doubly engaged enterprise”. My question is therefore: what is the best way to analyze hunger 
strike outcomes? As mentioned in Chapter 1, a quantitative analysis of hunger strikes have not 
been carried out before, but has now been made possible with available quantitative data. The 
quantitative method allows to draw general conclusions about causal conjunctions. As a 
protest tactic, hunger strikes have proved to be a global phenomenon occurring in all political 
and economic systems and cultures (Scanlan et al., 2008: 293). In Section 2.1.2, I have 
illustrated how hunger strikes as a tactic managed to spread fast new continents, where it was 
applied in the same manner but with different legitimization. In order to analyze hunger strike 
outcomes as a global phenomenon I hold that a quantitative method is the most appropriate. 
 Data 3.2
Here, I will present the data I intend to use in this thesis. Firstly, I describe the most important 
data, namely the hunger strike dataset (Scanlan et al., 2008) which includes the dependent 
variable and several independent variables. Then, I present the data sources which includes 
my country specific independent variables, respectively the Polity IV democracy scale 
(Marshall and Gurr, 2012) and ACLP/DDs data on coalition governments (Cheibub et al., 
2005).  
 The hunger Strike data set 3.2.1
The main data set in this thesis is a hunger strike data set made by Scanlan et al. (2008) 
containing 1441 hunger strikes between 1906 and 2004, assembled from the New York 
Times, Keesing’s Worldwide Online, and The Economist. It is an event based dataset where 
each observed hunger strike amounts to one observation. When more than one person 
participates in the same hunger strike, it counts as one hunger strike. The main challenge 
using this data set is that a there’s missing data on many variables, including the dependent 
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variable. Even though 1441 cases is a lot, especially when we deal with categorical data, the 
number is still probably far from the real number of hunger strikes in the world in this period. 
As an example, Johanna Siméant (1999) analyzed hunger strikes in France between 1972 and 
1992 and managed to find 547 cases using only a single source, the daily newspaper Le 
Monde, whereas this dataset only has 45 cases of hunger strikes in France in a period five 
times longer. 
Choosing observations 
It is important to make active decisions about data observations. If not, we risk analyzing 
something else than what was intended. There are several considerations behind my choice of 
observations. As already presented in Chapter 2 (Section 2.5, Figure 2.2), the data in the first 
half of the 20
th
 century is very scarce. Out of the 1441 observations in the data set, 
observations before 1946 only amount to 149, whereby only a quarter are not missing on the 
dependent variable. Including these observations has very limited value. This is a strong 
argument for excluding the observations from the earliest period. Another argument for this is 
that supplementary data, such as data on coalition governments, prior to 1946 is difficult to 
find. I’ve therefore decided to set the period of my analysis from 1946 to 2004. 
According to the definition of hunger strikes, as presented in Section 2.1, hunger strikes with 
targets other than government or government institutions will not be included in the analysis.
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Another category of hunger strikes that falls outside the aim of this thesis is  hunger strikes 
that takes place in another country than that of its targets. As I hypothesize a combination of 
hunger strike specific and regime specific factors as relevant for hunger strike outcomes, this 
category will create problems as to what we are really explaining. This category of hunger 
strikes are therefore excluded from the analysis.
6
 Regarding the choice of observations, an 
alternative strategy could be to add dummy variables for every category of observations that 
deviates from the normal. Achen (2002) strongly warns against this strategy, because it 
distorts the analysis and complicates interpretations.  
Finally, when I also have excluded all observations that were missing on the 
dependent variable and those that were still ongoing at the time of the media report, I’m left 
with a total of respectively 445 valid observations. But, when including the variables “size” 
and “length”, only 285 observations are left. In the analysis strategy in Section 3.3.3, I will 
discuss how the analysis can be best carried out given these limitations. 
                                                 
5
 Among all observations, 122 are in this category. 
6
 Among all observations, 90 are in this category. 
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Biased data? 
Out of the 445 valid observations in the dataset, 84 (18%) were carried out in the United 
States. The second country with most cases is the USSR/Russia with 35 cases (8%). The 
authors of the dataset admits that New York Times is the likely reason for this imbalance 
(Scanlan et al., 2008: 316). Table 3.1 lists the sources of the dataset and their shares of the 
contribution, where New York Times appears as the overwhelmingly most contributing 
sources. A US bias can potentially drive the results. For example, a factor only present in 
United States might be associated with the whole dataset, where we risk committing a type I 
error. Inversely, observations from United States might reduce or distort a factor that would 
normally exists in rest of the data, where we risk committing a type II error (Skog, 2004: 
103). A dummy variable indicating whether the observations are carried out in the United 
States will therefore work as a control variable that captures the eventual effect of United 
States observations.  
Table 3.1: List of sources and their contribution to the dataset 
Source Time span N % 
The New York Times 1906 – 2004 1001 61 
Keesing’s Worldwide Online 1931 – 2004 450 27 
The Economist 1906 – 2004 192 12 
 
 Using event data 3.2.2
The main methodological challenge in this thesis is the uncertainty of whether my data is 
representative for the whole “population” of hunger strikes. This constitutes a double 
problem: Firstly, one can anticipate that some hunger strike outcomes are more likelihood of 
being reported than others due to their newsworthiness. Secondly, it’s likely that the 
probability that a hunger strike is reported correctly, or reported at all, varies with different 
types of regimes due to restrictions like state censorship. It’s especially doubtful that 
information about hunger strikes conducted in prisons or jails in non-democracies manages to 
reach the media uncensored or undistorted.  
When coding event data, the sources one uses and the manner of the coding matters 
for the result (Nam, 2006). The data set on hunger strikes is, what a commonly referred to as, 
“event count studies”, a sub-category of media based data (Woolley, 2000). The principle is 
that each event is counted only once, irrespective of the number of times it is mentioned in the 
media. According to Woolley (2000: 158) the most important questions for researchers using 
37 
 
event counts are whether events are underrepresented or overrepresented, and whether 
eventual biases are stable over time. In addition, we should ask to what extent variation really 
reflects the reality or different media practices. He also concludes that “hard facts” are less 
subject to bias than events that are open to subjective interpretation. In addition, larger and 
more significant events, especially when violent, are also more likely to be reported and less 
biased. Along the same lines, Biggs (2007: 4) argues that hunger strikes ending in death 
naturally attract far more attention than those ending with one side or the other backing down. 
It’s accordingly more difficult to find information on those hunger strikers that won their 
release or got other concessions. 
Looking at Scanlan et al. (2008) dataset between 1906 and 2004 it’s easy to see that 
this might have been the case in the earliest data. Between 1906 and 1945, deaths stood for 21 
% of the identified hunger strike outcomes (only 42 observations). Today however, deaths in 
hunger strikes are very uncommon. Between 1946 and 2004 the number is reduced to 4 %. 
Some of the discrepancy also probably reflects the reality. As discussed in Section 2.5, data 
indicates that the threshold of carrying out a hunger strike has lowered with time, opening up 
for shorter and less lethal hunger strikes. 
 Dealing with missing or incomplete data 3.2.3
There are several variables in the data set with a lot of missing and/or incomplete data.  
In some cases, a possible, yet dangerous, method of dealing with missing data could be 
manual imputation Honaker and King (Honaker and King, 2010: 561). It simply means to 
replace missing observations with data that are probably based on other available information. 
I have been careful using this method, and only applied it in 47 observations where country 
was not identified, but could be identified investigating other variables. 
An important reason behind the missing data on the dependent variable is that the 
hunger strikes were not finished at the time it was registered in the news. This means that the 
media did not (sufficiently) cover the hunger strike after its end. Among the missing data, 
73% are ongoing. 
How severe the problem of missing data is depends on which of the three types it is: 
missing at random (MAR), missing completely at random (MCAR) or data missing not at 
random (MNAR) (Stuart et al., 2009: 1134). Since the missing data is due to lack of 
reporting, its reason to assume MNAR. A possible reason for MNAR data could be 
censorship and lack of press freedom, something that varies across political regimes. 
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I will here try to investigate whether there’s a relationship between missing data and 
lack of democracy by distributing values from the Polity2 variable from the Polity IV dataset 
(Marshall and Gurr, 2012), which, as I will present in Section 3.2.4, will be used as an 
independent variable measuring level of democracy in this analysis. Figure 3.1 presents 
distributions of the Polity2 variable on the two hunger strike populations N=1290 and N=445, 
both for the period 1946 to 2004. The largest population is the total hunger strikes while the 
smallest is that where observations with missing values on the dependent variable is excluded, 
in addition to hunger strikes with other targets than government and hunger strikes that takes 
place in a different country than that they demands concessions from. We see here that the 
normality curves are not very different on the two different hunger strike populations, which 
indicates that the missing data on the dependent variable is not more associated with non-
democracies than democracies.  
Figure 3.1: Polity2 distribution on different hunger strike populations 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the Polity2 distribution on the total population, meaning the scores of all 
countries between 1946 and 2004. It’s normality curve is more centered, compared to the two 
curves in Figure 3.1. This tells us that the observed hunger strikes in the dataset have 
generally taken place in countries more democratic than the average. We can anticipate that 
this is because of censorship or lack of free media in non-democracies. But it can might as 
well mean that hunger strikes as a tactic is actually more widely used in democracies. To 
conclude, from what we know about the distribution of political regimes in the hunger strike 
dataset, there’s no indication that missing data are more associated with non-democracies than 
with democracies. 
Figure 3.2: Polity2 distribution on total population 
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3.2.3.1 The dependent variable: Hunger strike outcome 
The dependent variable of this thesis is the hunger strike outcome, as conceptualized in 
Section 2.2.2 with the following four outcomes: concession, surrender, death and forced end. 
In this section, I explain the details of how the outcomes as originally registered in the hunger 
strike dataset have been categorized to fit in the four outcomes. The original hunger strike 
dataset (Scanlan et al., 2008), included the variable outcome which consisted of 375 different 
specific outcomes. These outcomes had also been summarized into a variable with 23 
categories in the original dataset. In addition, two additional variables indicated whether a 
combination of two or three outcomes had occurred in the same hunger strike.  
I have re-categorized the 23 hunger strike outcome categories into a final variable with 
four outcomes. Most of these categories have been easy to place, but some needed additional 
inquiries and more considerations. Regarding the outcome concession, it is for example 
difficult to know to what extent a state concession actually fulfilled the initial demand of the 
hunger striker. Therefore I’ve chosen to label all sorts of concessions and partly concessions 
accepted by the hunger striker as “concession”. There’s a big variation in the types of 
concessions, as some examples are given here: release from prison, amnesty granted, special 
status granted, reduced sentence, scholarship increase, a prime minister’s resignation, wage 
increases, reopening of banned publication and granting legal support during trial.  
Challenges arise in situations where, according to the dataset, more than one outcome 
has occurred. For example, a hunger striker may be forcible fed and at a later stage gain 
concession that was accepted. This combination has occurred three times in the dataset. In 
these cases I have labelled the outcome as “concession” because that was the closing decision 
made by the authorities. Thus, this outcome more accurately expresses the character of the 
state, which ultimately was willing to concede. Another scenario, which has also happened 
three times in the dataset, is when the hunger striker dies as a consequence of forcible feeding. 
In those cases I have categorize the outcomes as “forced end”. As explained in Section 2.2.2, 
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
D
e
n
s
it
y
-10 -5 0 5 10
Polity2 (Total population)
40 
 
the outcome forced end is meant to capture the state’s willingness to interfere by force to stop 
the hunger strike, irrespective of which means it applies and which are its consequences. The 
outcome “death”, on the other hand, is only meant to capture death by starvation, a situation 
where the state does not intervene. Therefore, to give another example, if hunger strikers 
being executed as, as has happened in only one case, it is categorized as forced end. The other 
more specific kinds of outcomes that have been categorized as “forced end” are the following: 
court action, deportation, disciplinary action, extradition, police arrests and 
sentenced/charged. Another difficult scenario is when forcible feeding is applied, but doesn’t 
prevent deaths from occurring. This has only occurred once in the dataset, with a group of 
hunger strikers. Even though it was the authorities’ decision to stop the hunger striker, I’ve 
decided that deaths overrides previous forcible feedings because of their significance, and 
these cases are therefore categorized as “death”. The discussion could continue over more 
possible combinations of outcomes, but as I have not identified any more in the dataset, it is 
not needed to go further. 
3.2.3.2 Independent variables 
Length 
The variable length registers the amount of days the hunger strike have lasted. Given that 
hunger strikes can consists of more than one participants, and that participants may join in at 
different times, this variable is not a measure of how “lethal” the hunger strike becomes, but a 
measure of how long the protest event have lasted. As discussed in Section 2.1.1, some 
hunger strikers may also decide to take limited nourishment on the side, which may prolong 
the hunger strikes for years. As a result, the dataset shows a few hunger strikes lasting as 
much as 1000 days. There are very few cases where hunger strikers state publicly that they 
take limited nourishment. This way of “cheating” may potentially happen in greater numbers 
than we know, but it is anyway a factor that is difficult to control for. These long lasting 
hunger strikes are therefore included in the analysis. In post-estimation, inspection of the 
residuals will reveal whether or not extreme hunger strike lengths drive the results. 
The duration of a hunger strike can be a contested subject. In many cases hunger 
strikers and authorities gives different estimates. When the dataset consists of several 
durations I have used the most conservative number. A challenge with measuring the length 
of hunger strikes is that this is sometimes disputed by the different actors. Because of this, the 
dataset includes two variables measuring both the most minimum and maximum estimates of 
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the length. But the variations between these variables are so small that I choose to go for the 
minimum estimates variables without any more considerations. 
Size 
The variable size measures the number of hunger strikers participating in the same hunger 
strike. Because participants of a hunger strike can join or quit during the strike, the number of 
participants differs at the beginning and at the end. In 82 cases, the number of hunger strikers 
has either increased or decreased during the strike, whereby the largest discrepancy is 8000.  
The dataset therefore includes three different measures of hunger strike size: (1) the size at the 
start of the hunger strike, (2) the size at the end of the hunger strike, and (3) the maximum 
estimate if sources are unclear. Most observations only have reported size in the first 
category. If the hunger strike is reported to have increased or decreased during the strike, 
category two is reported. When the size of the hunger strike is disputed, category 1 takes 
minimum, estimate, while category 3 takes the maximum estimate.  
Because the outcome of the hunger strike is decided at the end of the hunger strike, it 
makes most sense to use the end-size as the main variable. But because the variation is big, I 
will also test the two other variables at a later stage in the analysis. 
Multiple location 
The dummy-variable Multiple locations indicates whether the hunger strike have taken place 
at more than one location, being different cities, universities, and so on. This variable measure 
indicate whether the hunger strike has extended support, but a weakness in this variable is that 
missing values has been recoded as “no” in order to have enough valid observations. For most 
observations, no information in the media regarding multiple locations would strongly 
indicate that it only took place at one location, but this can also be problematic. 
Hunger strike motivation 
As already fully described in Section 2.5, the hunger strikes are categorized into ten 
categories of political motivation according to political fields. This is the closest we come to a 
measure of the hunger strikers’ demands, which should to a certain extent be captures by 
these variables. As not all categories can be measured in the regression analysis, I’ve decided 
to choose two categories that can test the effect of two contrasting motivations. 
 In Table 2.4, eight of the ten categories (all except “other issues” and “unclear”) are 
cross-correlated with various variables, including the four hunger strike outcomes. The types 
of motivation that have the highest correlations are “Peace, war and conflict”, “social 
inequality”, “Labor, work and the economy”, “Immigration and asylum” and “Student and 
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educational concerns”. Out of these, I find “Peace, war and conflict” and “Immigration and 
asylum” to be two quite contrasting categories. As mentioned in Section 2.5, hunger strikers 
within the “peace, war and conflict” category are striking for others than themselves (antiwar, 
nuclear issues), while the “immigration and asylum” are motivated by their own situation as 
refugees and asylum seekers. Therefore, these two variables will be tested in the analysis. 
Hunger strike frequency 
The continuous variable hunger strike frequency measures the amount of previous hunger 
strikes a country has experienced. This variable is intended to measure the experience of 
hunger strikes, because it is assumed that countries are able to learn from this experience (see 
Section 2.4.2). 
Control variables 
As mentioned in Section 3.2.1, I will apply a dummy variable indicating whether observations 
are from the United States in order to control the effect of the large amount of observations 
from one  country. 
 Country data 3.2.4
Level of democracy 
Level of democracy will be measured by the variable Polity2 from the dataset The Polity IV 
Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2012 (Marshall and Gurr, 
2012). The variable is a scale ranging from -10 being the least democratic to 10 being the 
most democratic. There are many measures of democracy, which all have their strengths and 
weaknesses. One favorable property of the Polity2 variable is that it is a scale, which allows 
for a more substantial interpretation than with a dummy variable. Another is that they, in 
contrast to Freedom House, are completely open about their indicator scores.  
The Polity2 variable is made out of several criteria, where their main focus is on 
formal institutional. Their five criteria are the following: competitiveness of executive 
recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, constraints on the chief executive, 
competitiveness of political participation and regulation of participation. The two last criteria 
appears most relevant for my purpose. Competitiveness of political participation refers to: 
“the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the 
political arena”. While regulation of participation refers to “the extent that there are binding 
rules on when, whether, and how political preferences are expressed.” These elements are in 
accordance with the initial intention of having this variable in the analysis, as discussed in 
Section 2.4.2, namely to see whether states that are open to participation and thus protest 
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(political input structures), also are environments where hunger strikes are more likely to gain 
concessions. The Polity2 variable has been criticized for the lack of civil liberties (Knutsen, 
2011: 91) but for my purposes in this thesis, that will not be a problem. 
Coalition government 
Coalition government will be measured by a dummy variable from the Democracy and 
Development Extended Data Set, an extension of the ACLP dataset (Cheibub et al., 2005). 
The dataset stretches from 1946 up to today. 
 The statistical model 3.3
 The Multinomial logit model 3.3.1
My dependent variable consists of four categorical outcomes that cannot be naturally ordered. 
The most appropriate regression method is therefore the multinomial logit model (MNLM). 
The model computes separate binary logit estimations for each pair of outcomes (Long and 
Freese, 2006: 223-224). Reducing the outcome to a binary model with a dichotomous 
outcome would simplify the analysis, but this would waste valuable information. The MNLM 
uses maximum likelihood to estimate a likelihood function. It iterates until the maximum 
likelihood is reached (Long and Freese, 2006: 76). 
Models with categorical outcomes are per definition nonlinear. It’s therefore crucial to 
understand the meaning of nonlinearity in order to interpret the results of my models (Long 
and Freese, 2006: 113). In linear models, the effect of a change in a given independent 
variable on the dependent variable is not conditioned on the value of that variable when it 
starts to change or on the values of other independent variables in the model. In nonlinear 
models, a change in the variable will have different effects according to its value when it 
starts to change. The effect is also dependent of the level of the other variables (Long and 
Freese, 2006: 115-116). The most common approach to nonlinear interpretation is predictions, 
marginal effects and creating meaningful “profiles” where predicted values can be presented. 
Long and Freese (2006, 118) strongly suggest applying a variety of methods in order to 
illustrate the results of a nonlinear model. 
 Assumptions and requirements 3.3.2
Sample size 
In ML models, generally a minimum sample of 100 is needed, while a sample size over 500 is 
sufficient in most cases. More specifically, a rule of thumb suggests at least 10 observations 
per parameter (Long, 1997: 54). But it’s desired to have 20 observations per parameter. My 
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first analysis consists of 445 observations while the second has 285. The full model has seven 
variables. Conducting a multinomial logit with a dependent variable with four values and 
seven variables amounts to 21 parameters. This should satisfy the absolute requirement, but is 
close to being too small. 
Independence among variables 
In multinomial logit, it is not a requirement that variables are statistically independent. 
However, large correlations may create problems for the estimates and the interpretations. To 
test whether there are serious problems with multicollinearity, a variance inflation factors 
(VIF) test can be carried out. Table 1 in Appendix B lists the VIFs of the independent 
variables. A rule of thumbs suggests that VIF should be under 10 or have a tolerance (1/VIF) 
over .10. It also suggests that a VIF over 5 should be examined (Midtbø, 2012: 129). The 
variables with highest correlations are “hunger strike frequency” (6.66) and the dummy 
variable United States (7.56). We can anticipate that these two variables are correlated with 
each other. Table 2 with cross-correlations in Appendix B confirms that they are highly 
correlated (0.9061). I will solve this by only applying the two variables separately. Apart from 
this, the highest correlations in Table 2 are the correlations between Polity2 and “hunger 
strike frequency” (0.4224) and between “hunger strike frequency” and United States (0.3978). 
But as they are under 5, the rule of thumbs suggests that they can be applied in the same 
model. This means that multicollinearity is not a concern for my analysis.  
Independence of irrelevant alternatives 
An important assumption in multinomial modeling is the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA). The IIA assumes that the log-odds of a given outcome is independent of the 
availability of other outcomes (Long and Freese, 2006: 243). McFadden (1973) said that 
multinomial or conditional logit only should be used if the alternatives “can plausibly be 
assumed to be distinct and weighted independently in the eyes of each decision-maker”. 
Hunger strike outcomes are not strictly choices but results of choices made by hunger 
striker and authorities and government during the hunger strike. The results of these choices 
add up to the four possible outcomes in this thesis as illustrated in Table 2.2. The government 
can choose to grant a concession or to interfere with physical force to stop the hunger strike. 
The hunger striker can choose to surrender at any time. If none of these three choices are 
taken, the hunger striker will eventually die of starvation. 
 The IIA assumes that the log-odds of a given outcome don’t change if the number of 
available outcomes is reduced or expanded. Since the four hunger strike outcomes in this 
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thesis are operationalized with the purpose of including all cases, it’s not easy to come up 
with more alternatives. However there’s a chance that in some situations the available 
outcomes are reduced to three. If for example a country has decided to outlaw the use of 
forcible feeding. We can anticipate that this would increase the chances that a hunger striker 
in prison will die or gain concessions, since there’s now no way for a government to thwart 
death except granting a concession acceptable for the hunger striker. 
 It’s possible to test whether the IIA assumptions holds using  Hausman-McFadden 
(HM) test and the Small-Hsiao (SM) test by running tests with and without a reduced set of 
alternatives. The SM test is likely to give better results in smaller datasets and therefore the 
preferable among them. However, in many cases these two tests give answers that are 
contradictory, and their use are therefore not encouraged by Long and Freese (2006: 244).  
I have nevertheless carried out the tests.
7
 Results from both tests are listed in 
Appendix B. The Hausman test does not reject the hypothesis that the IIA assumption holds, 
while the Small-Hsiao test rejects the hypothesis. 
Scaling, centering and transformation 
Long and Freese (2006: 77) warn against problems of interpreting ML estimations if the data 
is not “cleaned”. If one variable contains a very high interval compared to another, this will 
cause large ratios between the smallest and largest standard deviations.   
What’s most important for quantitative research is to separate what’s important from 
what’s unimportant. Therefore its crucial to not only measure direction and significance, but 
also the size of the effect (Ziliak and McCloskey, 2004). The variable hunger strike 
frequency, ranging between 1 and 358 is therefore divided on 100 so it is more comparable to 
the other variables. The other variables are centered on the mean so that the intercept can be 
interpreted as the average probability (Stock and Watson, 2012: 152).  
Tests shows that both continuous variables Length and Size fit the description of non-
normality according to and are therefore transformed into their natural logarithms. This will 
help mitigate or eliminate both potential problems of skewness and heteroscedasticity 
(Wooldridge, 2009: 191). 
Clustered data 
Whenever a group of observations are to be considered as a subset of other observations, we 
are dealing with clustered (also known as hierarchical) data (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002: 
                                                 
7
 The Hausman test is not compatible with clustered standard errors. I have therefore run both tests on the basis 
of a model with unadjusted standard errors. 
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219). As I have presented in Chapter 2, hunger strike outcomes are the results of both 
country-specific factors and factors concerning the individual hunger strikes. As illustrated in 
section 2.1, the hunger strike process interlinks the protester with civil society, the public and 
the government. It’s been noted by Scanlan et al. (2008: 313) that “Hunger strikes (…) bridge 
micro- and macro-structural processes”, because they are “…relevant to many facets of social 
movement research including movement emergence, policing, tactical repertoires, and social 
movement success”. I will therefore argue that hunger strikes are natural subsets of the 
countries where they take place, firstly because of the political and societal surroundings of 
each country by which every hunger strikes must accommodate, and secondly because of the 
characteristics of the governments in which the hunger strikes aims to get concessions from. 
Since much of what we study is naturally multilevel we should apply statistical model that are 
also multilevel (Luke, 2004: 4). Whenever researchers aim to show causal connections 
between factors operating at different levels, a multilevel analysis is the desired method 
(Luke, 2004: 22-23).  
However, when running the intercept-only model (also called empty model) it shows a 
very tiny intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) (ICC = 0.000, Std. Err = 0.013). The ICC 
decomposes the variance in the dependent variable and tells us the proportion of the variance 
that can be explained between groups (clusters). In this case, it tells how much of the variance 
in hunger strike outcomes that can be explained within countries. When this proportion equals 
to zero, it means there is no cluster variance to explain using a multilevel analysis (Hox, 2010: 
56, Luke, 2004: 18). I will therefore use the multinomial logit model with clustered standard 
errors, as suggested by Stock and Watson (2012: 406). 
 Analysis strategy 3.3.3
A lesson that is often taught is that adding variables in a model should be guided strictly by 
theory (King et al., 1994: 182-183). Having too many variables in a statistical model will end 
up explaining a lot of the variance in the model but without showing any logical causal 
connections. This approach is often called the “kitchen sink” approach (Collier and Brady, 
2010: 6). This points can be even more important in models with many parameters, such as 
the multinomial logit model. That said, having to explain four outcomes, also demands more 
explanatory power. Therefore, I have to balance this ideal against the need to have a model 
that manages to distinguish between my outcomes. 
In order to make the most out of the limited data, I will conduct two analysis with 
different sample sizes. Because of the missing data on the important variables “size” and 
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“length” I will first run four models (Model 1 to 4) without these two variables, testing all 
other variables on a larger sample (N = 445) which will give the most reliable estimates of the 
effects. When I then go over to Model 5 to 7, which include size and length in a smaller 
sample (N = 285), the four first models will be used as a reference of reliability for 
interpreting any eventual changes caused by reducing the sample. A weakness in reducing the 
sample size is that these models cannot be meaningfully compared with the prior models 
through LR tests. However, the variables’ directions, sizes, as well as significance will 
indicate whether the smaller sample models are as valid as the large sample models.  
The models will be presented step by step, adding predictors and checking for their 
explanatory power and significance one model at the time. This way ensures that we manage 
to observe how the variables act and interact with each other. This is especially important here 
when not only dealing with a relatively small dataset but having many parameters and dealing 
with a relatively unexplored research topic where both the size and directions of the effects 
are unknown. Having seven models also makes it possible to measure the variables’ 
consistency and robustness across models.  
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 Analysis 4
In this chapter I see how well the empirical data in the hunger strike dataset fit my theoretical 
models. Firstly, I will present some descriptive statistics. Then I present the estimates from 
the multinomial logit regression and compare the measures of fit of variables of models 
through different tests. Lastly, I apply various post-estimation methods in order to present the 
findings and what they really mean. A conclusion on the findings is presented in Chapter 5. 
 Multinomial logit by default sets the outcome with most observations as the base 
category, also called reference group. The base category is the reference to which the other 
outcomes are compared. The most common hunger strike outcome in the dataset is 
Concession (40 %), followed by Surrender (38 %). I choose to set Surrender as the baseline 
outcome because the other three outcomes make more sense intuitively to explain. However, 
this choice only determines how the coefficient’s matrix looks and does not matter for the 
results. 
 Descriptive statistics 4.1
Before going to the regression analysis, it is fruitful to use simple descriptive statistics as 
cross-tabulation and plots. Achen (2005: 338) argues that these classical techniques are 
underrated. Although they are simple, they often exposes failures in the assumptions of 
regression models and save us from committing errors. I have already presented some cross-
tabulations in Section 2.5 in order to expose trends and patterns in the hunger strike dataset, 
but that was using all 1441 observations between 1906 to 2004. Here, in the descriptive 
statistics, I limit the number of observations to the 445 valid observations between 1946 and 
2004 used in the first analysis with Model 1 to 4. Before starting the second analysis with 
Model 5 to 7, I will examine what the reduction in observations means for the data.  
 Table 4.1 lists the total distribution of outcomes. It shows that there’s only 21 
observations (5%) of the outcome death. This might indicate a problem. 
Table 4.1: Outcome distribution 
Outcome Freq. Percent 
Concession 178 40.0 
Surrender 167 37.5 
Death 21 4.7 
Forced end 79 17.8 
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Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of the different motivations behind hunger strikes. It shows 
that the two types of motivation used as independent variables only amounts to around 5% 
each of the total observations.  
Figure 4.1: Motivations behind hunger strike (N = 445) 
 
 First analysis 4.2
The models will be presented in coefficient matrixes based upon the regression estimates. In 
multinomial logit, the coefficient matrix excludes the outcome which is set to be the reference 
category, which I choose to be outcome “surrender”. The raw coefficients in multinomial logit 
can be translated into logits or log-odds (the logarithm of the odds). This is different from 
probabilities which can be predicted on a scale between 0 and 1, and odds-ratios (also called 
factor change coefficients), which refer to factor change in the odds. Probabilities and odds-
ratios will be presented after Model 7. Before that, only raw unstandardized coefficients will 
be used. These will also be referred to as log-odds. 
All variables are centered, which means that the constant (intercept) shows the log-
odds when all other variables are average. The constant can then be interpreted as the average 
log-odds, all else being equal. 
 
 
 
 
0 50 100 150 200 
Frequency 
Prisons and the justice system 
Government and political reform 
Other issues 
Labor, work and the economy 
Human rights and civil liberties 
Peace, war, and conflict 
Immigration and asylum 
Social inequality 
Unclear 
Student and educational concerns 
50 
 
Table 4.2: Detailed list of variables (N = 445)
8
 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Max 
Outcome 445 2.0 1.1 1 4 
Peace, war, and conflict 445 0.06 0.2 0 1 
Immigration and asylum 445 0.05 0.2 0 1 
Incarcerated 445 0.5 0.5 0 1 
Multiple locations 445 0.2 0.4 0 1 
PolityIV 445 3.2 7.3 -10 10 
Coalition govt. dummy 445 0.3 0.5 0 1 
Hunger strike frequency 445 56 89 1 358 
United States 445 0.2 0.4 0 1 
 
 Models 1 - 2 4.2.1
In the following section I discuss the results of the first two models and evaluate each 
variable. The purpose of this is to explain and justify my further specification decisions. 
Estimates from Model 1 and 2 are presented in Table 4.3. Model 1 includes all internal hunger 
strike-related variables: the two motivation variables Immigration and asylum and Peace, war 
and conflict, plus the variables Incarcerated and Multiple locations. The Likelihood-ratio 
(LR) test shows that the model significantly contributes to the understanding the outcome, 
compared to an empty, intercept only, model. The Wald two-tailed chi-squared test shows that 
the two motivation-variables are significant at the .001 level while Incarcerated is at the .05 
level. Multiple locations does not significantly contribute to the model (X
2
 = 0.800, df = 3, p < 
1.0) and is therefore omitted from the following models. Model 2 adds the political context 
variables Polity IV (democracy score) and “coalition government”. LR and Wald tests show 
that both Polity IV and coalition government contribute to the model, respectively at the .001 
and the .05 level. The effect of being motivated by peace, war and conflict is significant at the 
0.001 level. It reduces the log-odds of gaining concession from 0.035 to -1.415 
(intercept[0.035] + coef.[-1.45]). 
                                                 
8
 Variables are here presented in their original format, non-centered and non-transformed. 
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Being motivated by immigration and asylum has the opposite effect, increasing the 
log-odds of gaining concession from 0.035 to 1.335. This effect is significant at the 0.01 level. 
The effect of the Polity IV democracy scale is only significant at the 0.05 level. Hunger 
striking in a country indexed at 1 compared to 0 will only result in a modest decrease the log-
odds of concession from 0.035 to -0.002. But because the variable is a 20-point scale, its 
effect is larger than it at first sight. If a hunger strike takes place in a country with Polity IV 
score 10 (most democratic), compared to a country with score 0, all else being equal, the log-
odds of gaining concession is reduced from 0.035 to -0.335 (intercept[0.035]+(coef.[-
Table 4.3: Estimates from multinomial logit, Model 1-2 
  Model 1  Model 2 
OUTCOME VARIABLES Coef. S.E.  Coef. Coef. 
       
CONCESSION Peace, war, and conflict -1.76*** (0.46)  -1.45*** (0.40) 
 Immigration and asylum 1.43** (0.47)  1.30** (0.47) 
 Incarcerated -0.23 (0.24)  -0.15 (0.23) 
 Polity IV    -0.037* (0.015) 
 Coalition government    0.60** (0.21) 
 Multiple locations -0.072 (0.31)    
 Constant 0.078 (0.13)  0.035 (0.089) 
DEATH Peace, war, and conflict 0.059 (1.21)  0.18 (1.15) 
 Immigration and asylum -12.0*** (0.68)  -12.1*** (0.68) 
 Incarcerated 1.80** (0.62)  1.83** (0.60) 
 Polity IV    -0.0050 (0.036) 
 Coalition government    0.31 (0.68) 
 Multiple locations -0.093 (0.56)    
 Constant -3.08*** (0.35)  -3.10*** (0.33) 
FORCED END Peace, war, and conflict -1.64*** (0.37)  -1.22** (0.45) 
 Immigration and asylum 1.12* (0.53)  0.92* (0.44) 
 Incarcerated -0.25 (0.28)  -0.19 (0.26) 
 Polity IV    -0.073*** (0.016) 
 Coalition government    0.36 (0.24) 
 Multiple locations 0.23 (0.37)    
 Constant -0.73*** (0.16)  -0.79*** (0.12) 
       
 Observations 445   445  
 Log likelihood -508   -499  
 Pseudo R-squared 0.036   0.054  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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0.037]*Polity IV-score[10])).  The effect of carrying out a hunger striking in a country run by 
a coalition government compared to one that is not is significant at the 0.01 level. The log-
odds of concession after this change is increased from 0.035 to 0.635, thus a seemingly strong 
effect. 
I begin by discussing the determinants of the hunger strike outcome “death”. Only two 
variables seem to explain outcome death relative to surrender. Being motivated by 
“immigration and asylum” is significant at the 0.001 level, while being “incarcerated” is 
significant at the 0.01 level. Being motivated by immigration and asylum compared to being 
not reduces the log-odds from -3.10 to the exceptional -15.2. While deaths are already 
uncommon, they are even more unlikely to occur with this category of hunger strikers. Figure 
4.1 shows that the category “immigration and asylum” only makes out about 5%. That means 
that the effect doesn’t explain as much as we might think. 
The variable incarcerated has a significant effect on outcome death at the 0.01 level. 
Being incarcerated increases the log-odds of dying from -3.10 to -1.27. This effect is not very 
surprising, considering that the political impact of dying will increase when authorities can be 
more directly blamed for not taking properly care of the hunger striker. 
Three variables have significant effects on the outcome “forced end”: both motivation 
variables and Polity IV. Being motivated by “peace, war and conflict” is significant in both 
models but is reduced from the 0.001 to the 0.01 level from Model 1 to 2. Having peace, war 
and conflict as motivation decreases the log-odds of forced end from -0.79 to -2.01. The effect 
of being motivated by immigration and asylum rights is significant at the 0.05 level. Being 
motivated by immigration and asylum rights increases the log-odds of forced end from -0.79 
to 0.13. Lastly, the effect of Polity IV is significant at the 0.001 level. The log-odds of 
outcome forced end in a country with score 1 compared to 0 on the Polity IV score is 
decreased from -0.79 to -0.863. Hunger striking in the most democratic indexed country, with 
Polity IV score 10, compared to 0 decreases the log-odds to -1.52, while a hunger strike in the 
least democratic country, indexed as -10 increased the log-odds to -0.06. 
If we ignore the p-values and the coefficients’ sizes for a moment and only look at 
their directions, we are able to identify some patterns. The coefficients of “coalition 
government” and “Polity IV” all have the same direction on the three outcomes in the 
coefficient matrix. In addition, the two motivation variables and “incarcerated” have the same 
direction on outcome on concession and forced end. This means that no variables explaining 
concession and forced end are different with respect to direction. It’s a potential weakness in 
the model if the variables explaining concession and forced end are too similar. We can 
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explore this by testing whether all combinations of outcomes are indistinguishable in respect 
to the variables (Anderson, 1984). This can be tested with LR or Walt tests which should 
provide similar results (Long and Freese, 2006: 239-241). 
Table 4.4: Wald test for combining alternatives after Model 3 (N=445) 
Alternatives tested      chi
2
 df P>chi
2
 
Concession – Death     440.24 5 0.000 
Concession – Forced end       8.14 5 0.149 
Concession – Surrender      41.13 5 0.000 
Death – Forced end    492.51 5 0.000 
Death – Surrender     429.88 5 0.000 
Forced end – Surrender     47.67 5 0.000 
H
0
: All coefficients except intercepts associated with a given pair 
of alternatives are 0. 
Table 4.4 shows the result of the Wald test where all possible combinations of outcomes are 
tested. As suspected, the test does not reject the 0-hypothesis that the outcomes concession 
and forced end are not indistinguishable. The other pairs of outcomes are all distinguishable at 
the 0.001 level. This means that  the independent variables presented so far are not sufficient 
to distinguish these two outcomes.  
To sum up, Model 1 shows that the two motivation variables and “incarcerated” have 
a substantial effect on the hunger strike outcomes. Whether the hunger strike is carried out 
more than one place (“multiple locations”) does not seem to have a significant effect on 
explaining the outcome. In Model 2 both political context variables seem to have an impact 
on the model. No variables except “immigration and asylum” have an effect on more than two 
outcomes. 
 Models 3 - 4 4.2.2
Table 4.5 presents the next two models, Model 3 to 4. Model 3 adds the continuous variable 
“hunger strike frequency”. The Wald test shows that this variable significantly contributes to 
the model (X
2
 = 10.017, df = 3, p < 0.05). But the LR test does not prefer Model 3 over Model 
2 (LRX
2
 = 3.77, df = 3, p < 0.3). According to the Walt tests carried out on the other 
remaining variables, “coalition government “ now apparently is the problem (X2 = 5.158, df = 
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3, p < 0.2). The hunger strike frequency variable has a significant effect on the outcome of 
death. All three outcomes now each have three variables with significant effects. But only one 
variable has a significant effect on all outcomes: the peace, war and conflict motivation 
variable. 
 Most variables give unchanged coefficients after adding hunger strike frequency. The 
exceptions are coalition government and Polity IV. Polity IV has a significant effect at the 
0.05 level on concession in Model 2 but not in Model 3 (p = 0.111). It’s not surprising that 
hunger strike frequency “steals” some of Polity IVs explanatory power given the two 
variable’s relatively high correlation (r = 0. 4354, p < 0.001). This means that countries with 
high level of democracy tend to have more experience with hunger strikes over time. Having 
both these variables in the model will by necessity reduce each of their explanatory power.  
The effect of coalition government on concession is reduced from being significant at 
the 0.01 level in Model 2 to the 0.05 level in Model 3. The small change in its coefficients 
from Model 3 to Model 2 (-0.07) shows consistency. The slightly reduced explanatory power 
of coalition government can be explained by the negative correlation between coalition 
government and hunger strike frequency (r = -0.3017, p < 0.001). This correlation means that 
countries run by coalition governments tends to have less of experience with hunger strikes. 
Since the coefficient of hunger strike frequency on concession is negative and the coefficient 
of coalition government is positive, these two variables have to sheer the same explanatory 
power. The effect of hunger strike frequency on concession is significant at the 0.01 level. 
The more experience a country has of hunger strikes in the past, the lower is the log-odds of 
dying of starvation in a hunger strike. In the time and place with most accumulated experience 
of hunger strikes, 358 hunger strikes in USA 2002, the log-odds of dying is reduced from -
3.15 (average is 58 hunger strikes) to -5.06 (intercept[-3.15] + (coef.[-0.63] * highest 
frequency[3.032271])).
9
 
                                                 
9
 The variable is mean-centered and divided on 100. 
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Inversely, the log-odds of dying when carrying out a hunger strike in a country with no 
experience of hunger strikes is increased from -3.15 to -2.81. This variable adds an important 
aspect to the understanding of outcome death, namely that states have learned to avoid what is 
in most cases the most costly outcome death (as discussed in Section 2.2.2). With regards to 
the model’s ability to distinguish between outcomes, another variable explaining death at 
slight expense of concession and forced end will probably make the two outcomes concession 
Table 4.5: Estimates from multinomial logit, Model 3-4 
  
Model 3  Model 4 
OUTCOME VARIABLES Coef. S.E.  Coef. S.E. 
       
CONCESSION Peace, war, and conflict -1.41*** (0.42)  -1.39** (0.42) 
 Immigration and asylum 1.31** (0.47)  1.29** (0.47) 
 Incarcerated -0.15 (0.23)  -0.15 (0.23) 
 Polity IV -0.031 (0.020)  -0.032 (0.021) 
 Coalition government 0.53* (0.27)  0.55 (0.28) 
 Hunger strike frequency -0.086 (0.11)    
 United States    -0.15 (0.29) 
 Constant 0.041 (0.094)  0.040 (0.095) 
DEATH Peace, war, and conflict 0.54 (1.26)  0.78 (1.27) 
 Immigration and asylum -12.4*** (0.67)  -12.6*** (0.66) 
 Incarcerated 1.90** (0.62)  1.86** (0.60) 
 Polity IV 0.029 (0.034)  0.031 (0.032) 
 Coalition government -0.11 (0.64)  -0.17 (0.64) 
 Hunger strike frequency -0.63** (0.22)    
 United States    -1.71*** (0.41) 
 Constant -3.15*** (0.29)  -3.17*** (0.28) 
FORCED END Peace, war, and conflict -1.25** (0.44)  -1.24** (0.43) 
 Immigration and asylum 0.90* (0.44)  0.92* (0.45) 
 Incarcerated -0.20 (0.26)  -0.19 (0.26) 
 Polity IV -0.077*** (0.022)  -0.074** (0.024) 
 Coalition government 0.39 (0.31)  0.36 (0.32) 
 Hunger strike frequency 0.069 (0.13)    
 United States    0.058 (0.36) 
 Constant -0.79*** (0.13)  -0.79*** (0.13) 
       
 Observations 445   445  
 Log likelihood -497   -496  
 Pseudo R-squared 0.058   0.059  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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and forced end more indistinguishable. The Wald test confirms that this is the case (X
2
 = 
8.688, df = 6, p < 0.192). 
Even though the LR test does not favor including hunger strike frequency on the 
expense of slightly reduced explanatory power of Polity IV and coalition government, I 
decide to keep all variables for now. I regard it as a slight improvement of the model because 
it adds more understanding of the outcome death without really distorting any other clear 
effects.  
Model 4 replaces “hunger strike frequency” with the control variable United States, 
which is a dummy variable that indicates whether the hunger strike is carried out in the United 
States. As mentioned in Section 3.3.2, the two variables are very highly correlated (r = 
0.9051, p < 0.001) and will distort a model if applied simultaneously. United States is the 
country with the highest number of observations in the dataset (18%). As discussed in Section 
3.3.1, the observations from United States might drive the results in a particular direction. The 
control variable United States will test whether observations from United States drive the 
results. The result of the Walt test shows that the variable United States does contribute to the 
model (X
2
 = 18.711, df = 3, p < 0.001), but the LR test finds Model 3 and 4 indistinguishable 
with respect to explanatory power (LRX
2
 = -1.27, df = 1, p = 1.0). 
A Wald test shows the same findings when the two variables are fitted in the same 
model and tested for whether they are indistinguishable, which they are not (X
2
 = 0.18, df = 1, 
p < 0.7).  United States also has a significant effect on death, but stronger than hunger strike 
frequency. Accordingly, deaths are less common in the United States in particular than in 
countries with high number of hunger strikes in general. Another change is that the effect of 
coalition government on concession is no longer significant, while its coefficient is practically 
the same, only reduced by -0.02.  This reduction can be explained with the correlation 
between United States and coalition government (r= 0.4487, p < 0.001) which higher than the 
correlation between coalition government and hunger strike frequency. The rest of the 
variables are practically untouched after controlling for United States. The variables also 
show a robust tendency when comparing to Model 2.  
 To sum up the first analysis. The analysis with 445 observations shows that certain 
types of motivations, being incarcerated, political context and “hunger strike frequency” can 
determine hunger strike outcomes. As mentioned, the independent variables presented so far 
does not manage to distinguish the two outcomes concession and forced end.  
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 Second analysis 4.3
In the second analysis, the sample size is reduced to 285. As I gained some knowledge about 
the variables applied in Model 1 to 4, I can more easily interpret Model 5 to 7 with a smaller 
sample size. In addition, size and length will also test the robustness of the other variables and 
work as control variables. 
 The list of variables is updated in Table 4.6 where the changes from the larger sample 
(N = 445) are included. We can see that the mean of the two motivation variables are slightly 
changed in the reduced sample. The mean of Polity2 is reduced by 0.2 and hunger strike 
frequency reduced by 3. These changes, although small, may be the source of eventual 
changes in the following models. 
Table 4.6: Detailed list of variables (N = 285) 
       Change from N= 445 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Max  Mean SD 
Outcome 285 2.0 1.1 1 4  0 0 
Peace, war, and conflict 285 0.05 0.2 0 1  -0.01 0 
Immigration and asylum 285 0.06 0.2 0 1  +0.01 0 
Incarcerated 285 0.5 0.5 0 1  0 0 
PolityIV 285 3.0 7.3 -9 10  -0.2 0 
Coalition govt. dummy 285 0.3 0.5 0 1  0 0 
Hunger strike frequency 285 53 88 1 354  -3 -1 
Size 285 356 3,048 1 50,000    
log(Size) 285 2.0 2.3 0 11    
Length 285 33 59 0.5 720    
log(Length) 285 2.8 1.2 -0.7 6.6    
 
 Models 5 - 7 4.3.1
Table 4.7 presents the next three models, Model 5 to 7. In these models I include the variables 
length and size. In Model 5 I first run the model without length and size to see whether 
eventual changes in other coefficients are due to size and length or just because of different 
sample size.  
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The estimates of Model 5 give coefficients that are generally slightly reduced  
compared to Model 4, but all directions are the same. The effect of Polity IV on outcome 
forced end is not significant at the 0.05 level, but at the 0.06 level (p = 0.053). 
Table 4.7: Estimates from multinomial logit, Model 5-7 
  
Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
OUTCOME VARIABLES Coef. S.E.  Coef. S.E.  Coef. S.E. 
          
CONCESSION Peace, war, and conflict -0.86 (0.50)  -0.82 (0.50)  -0.71 (0.46) 
 Immigration and asylum 2.20*** (0.45)  2.21*** (0.41)  2.29*** (0.39) 
 Incarcerated -0.21 (0.28)  -0.20 (0.28)    
 Polity IV -0.040 (0.021)  -0.042 (0.021)  -0.041 (0.021) 
 Coalition government 0.84** (0.32)  0.81* (0.34)  0.81* (0.34) 
 Hunger strike frequency 0.019 (0.12)  0.037 (0.12)  0.026 (0.12) 
 log(Length)    0.028 (0.13)  0.0039 (0.12) 
 log(Size)    0.058 (0.083)  0.061 (0.083) 
 Constant -0.00038 (0.11)  0.0011 (0.11)  -0.0020 (0.11) 
DEATH Peace, war, and conflict 2.16 (1.62)  1.20 (1.80)  -0.35 (1.56) 
 Immigration and asylum -9.48*** (1.06)  -10.7*** (0.87)  -11.6*** (0.86) 
 Incarcerated 2.56* (1.05)  1.82 (1.19)    
 Polity IV 0.042 (0.042)  0.034 (0.041)  0.031 (0.040) 
 Coalition government -0.066 (0.77)  0.10 (0.75)  0.15 (0.74) 
 Hunger strike frequency -1.23* (0.51)  -1.19* (0.49)  -1.15** (0.44) 
 log(Length)    0.78** (0.30)  0.97** (0.32) 
 log(Size)    -0.38 (0.23)  -0.37 (0.22) 
 Constant -3.21*** (0.50)  -3.96*** (0.66)  -3.60*** (0.33) 
FORCED END Peace, war, and conflict -1.25*** (0.30)  -1.22*** (0.30)  -1.10*** (0.23) 
 Immigration and asylum 1.50** (0.55)  1.37** (0.52)  1.45* (0.56) 
 Incarcerated -0.13 (0.33)  -0.22 (0.33)    
 Polity IV -0.065 (0.034)  -0.069 (0.036)  -0.069 (0.036) 
 Coalition government 0.51 (0.47)  0.36 (0.50)  0.36 (0.50) 
 Hunger strike frequency 0.19 (0.17)  0.22 (0.18)  0.22 (0.19) 
 log(Length)    0.29 (0.15)  0.27 (0.15) 
 log(Size)    0.15 (0.078)  0.15 (0.079) 
 Constant -0.78*** (0.17)  -0.84*** (0.20)  -0.84*** (0.19) 
          
 Observations 285   285   285  
 Log likelihood -320   -311   -314  
 Pseudo R-squared 0.071   0.098   0.089  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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The effect of the variable “peace, war and conflict” on concession is not anymore significant 
at the 0.05 level, but at the 0.09 level. Looking back at the details of the variables in Table 
4.6, these changes are likely to stem from the sample reduction. The general picture however 
is that the reduced sample, before length and size is added, does not unpredictably distort any 
of the effects. It rather shows that the effects from the previous models hold their grounds.  
A perhaps more unpredictable finding in Model 5 is that this model significantly 
distinguishes between the outcomes concession and forced end according to a Wald test (X
2
 =  
13.424, df = 6, p < 0.05). Since the directions of the effects are the same, the model’s ability 
to distinguish between outcomes are most surely because of the reduced explanatory power of 
two variables. I therefore conclude that Model 5 does not adequately distinguish between all 
outcomes. 
Model 6 adds the variables size and length. The Walt test shows that both size (X
2
 =  
8.612, df = 3, p < 0.05) and length (X
2
 =  9.339, df = 3, p < 0.05) have a modest but 
significant contribution to the model. Additional Wald tests reveal that among the old 
variables, three variables are just on the verge of being significant and one is not. Hunger 
strike frequency and Polity IV both are significant at the 0.06 level, while coalition 
government is at the 0.09 level. Incarcerated is now the variable least contributing to the 
model (X
2
 =  3.538, df = 3, p < 0.4).  
The variable’s coefficient on death is also no longer significant (p = 0.126). Since the variable 
incarcerated was significant in Model 5, its decreased effect in Model 6 must be due to one of 
the two added variables. Looking at the correlation between variables it seems that both of 
them have a fair amount of correlation with incarcerated. Largest is length (r = 0.2514, p < 
0.001). But size also has some negative correlation with incarcerated (r = -0.1486, p < 0.01). 
These correlations are intuitively understandable: long hunger strikes mostly happen inside 
jails while the largest hunger strikes happen outside jails. Regarding the model’s ability to 
distinguish between outcomes, the Wald test on Model 6 shows a slight setback (X
2
 =  
14.836, df = 8, p < 0.062). With two more variables, thus larger degrees of freedom, the Wald 
test is more demanding. Looking at the coefficient matrix, length and size mostly explains 
death but also forced end, although not at the 0.05 level. 
In the final Model 7 I exclude the variable incarcerated because it is the variable least 
contributing to the model. The LR test does not prefer Model 7 over 6  (LRX
2
 = 5.61, df = 3, 
p = 0.2). But Wald finds Model 7 to be an improvement with regards to Polity2 and hunger 
strike frequency, which now contributes significantly to the model. Only coalition 
government is still slightly insignificant (p = 0.086). The size of the coefficient of the variable 
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coalition government on the outcome concession is unchanged and is still significant at the 
0.05 level (p = 0.018). While the coefficient matrix give the impression that few variables 
explain the outcome forced end, several coefficients are very close to being significant. The 
effect of Polity IV on forced end is significant at the 0.06 level (p = 0.053). The effect of size 
on forced end is significant at the 0.06 level (p = 0.051), while the effect of length on forced 
end is significant at the 0.07 level (p = 0.067). Wald tests find that Model 7 manages to 
significantly distinguish between the outcomes concession and forced end (X
2
 =  14.894, df = 
7, p < 0.05). 
 Interpreting the results 4.4
In this section I will interpret the results of the analysis. In the previous sections the results 
have been reported in the form of raw coefficients, here also meaning log-odds, in coefficient 
matrixes. Logit or log-odds means the logarithm of odds. A more intuitive and pedagogical 
format would be probabilities and odds ratios. Probabilities range between 1 and 0 where 1 is 
the most and 0 least likely.  
The odds ratio tells us how many times greater (or smaller) the odds are when the 
independent variable increases by one unit. While odds are ratios of probabilities, odds ratios 
are ratios of the odds. Odds ratio means the change in odds at two different values of the 
independent variable. Odds ratios can also be easily found by calculating the exponential 
value of the regression coefficient (Skog, 2004: 365-366). Odds ratios are multiplicative, 
which means that negative effects are presented with numerals between 0 and 1 while positive 
effects are greater than one. A positive odds ratio of 2 will have the same magnitude as a 
negative change of 0.5 (Long and Freese, 2006: 179-180). 
 Table 4.8 lists the discrete changes in probabilities for all variables on each outcome. 
This gives an overview of the size of each effect.  
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Table 4.8: Discrete changes in outcome probabilities 
 
Concession Surrender Death Forced end 
Peace, war, and conflict -0.019 0.043 0.000 -0.024 
Immigration and asylum 0.120 -0.090 -0.047 0.017 
Polity IV -0.036 0.084 0.005 -0.053 
Coalition government 0.077 -0.072 -0.001 -0.004 
Hunger strike frequency -0.004 -0.012 -0.013 0.029 
log(Length) -0.029 -0.029 0.013 0.045 
log(Size) 0.012 -0.044 -0.012 0.044 
Pr (y|x) 0.419 0.387 0.0118 0.182 
Note: Change from 0 to 1 for binary variable, else a standard deviation change. 
 Size and length 4.4.1
Previously in the chapter, effects have been presented as coefficients, meaning log-odds. Here 
I present the effects in odds ratios and probabilities. Table 4.9 lists the odds ratios of a discrete 
change (e^b) and the odds ratios of a standard deviation change (e^bStdX) in hunger strike 
length. All comparisons with significance levels as low as 0.07 are listed, in order to also 
include several effects that are significant at the 0.06 and the 0.07 level.  
Table 4.9 reveals that for each additional day the hunger strike lasts, the odds of 
concession relative to death is decreased by a factor of 0.4. For each additional day of hunger 
striking the odds of dying relative to both surrender and concession is 2.6 times greater, while 
the odds of dying relative to forced end is twice as likely (2). It also tells that for each 
additional day, the odds of forced end relative to surrender is 1.3 times greater, while it 
decreases by a factor of 0.5 relative to death, meaning the odds are halve. The odds of 
surrender relative to death is decreased by a factor of 0.4 while the odds relative to forced end 
is decreased by a factor of 0.8. This means that the most substantial effect of length is on the 
outcome death. 
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Table 4.9: Odds ratios of the effect of length on pair of outcomes
10
 
Odds comparing 
Alternative 1 to  
Alternative 2 Coef. P>z e^b e^bStdX 
Concession – Death -0.966 0.002 0.381 0.315 
Death – Concession 0.966 0.002 2.628 3.180 
Death – Forced end 0.701 0.020 2.017 2.315 
Death – Surrender 0.970 0.003 2.639 3.195 
Forced end – Death -0.701 0.020 0.496 0.432 
Forced end – Surrender 0.269 0.067 1.309 1.380 
Surrender – Death -0.970 0.003 0.379 0.313 
Surrender – Forced end -0.269 0.067 0.764 0.725 
 
Table 4.10 shows the list of odds ratios of the effect of size. It shows that for each additional 
person participating in the hunger strike the odds of death relative to concession are reduced 
by a factor of 0.6. The odds of the outcome being forced end relative to surrender is 1.2 times 
greater, while the odds relative to death are 1.7 times greater. The odds of surrender relative to 
forced end are decreased by a factor of 0.9.  
Table 4.10: Odds ratios of the effect of size on pair of outcomes 
Odds comparing 
Alternative 1 to  
Alternative 2 Coef. P>z         e^b e^bStdX 
Concession – Death 0.436 0.041 1.546 2.744 
Death – Concession -0.436 0.041 0.647 0.365 
Death – Forced end -0.528 0.015 0.590 0.294 
Forced end – Death 0.528 0.015 1.696 3.400 
Forced end – Surrender 0.154 0.051 1.166 1.427 
Surrender – Forced end -0.154 0.051 0.858 0.701 
 
In order to present the relationship between the outcomes in a more graphic and intuitive way, 
Mlogplot can plot the results of all four outcomes together (Long and Freese, 2006: 260-
                                                 
10
 e^b = exp(b) = factor change in odds for unit increase in X 
e^bStdX = exp(b*SD of X) = change in odds for SD increase in X 
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272).
11
 Figure 4.2 shows the effect of length and size. The bottom scale of the figure shows 
the discrete change in coefficients, while the top scale shows factor changes in the odds. Both 
scales are relative to the outcome surrender, as in the coefficient matrix. Different outcomes 
are illustrated with their first letter: ‘C’ for concession, ‘S’ for surrender, ‘D’ for death and ‘F’ 
for forced end. The lines between letters means there’s not a significant effect between those 
two outcomes, thus that one outcome is not significantly more probable than the other. This 
plot is set to draw lines when significance levels are as low as the 0.07 level. This includes the 
effects mentioned in last paragraph that are significant at the 0.06 and 0.07 level. When a 
letter is on the right side of another, a change in the independent variable increases the 
likelihood of that outcome compared to the one to its left. In addition, the size of the letters 
are proportional to the discrete change in the odds-ratio. This is to show how the change in 
odds due to discrete change is larger or smaller at different values of the variables. This means 
that if the absolute change in odds multiplies for each value, the relative change in odds (odds 
ratio) may be the same (Skog, 2004: 364). 
Figure 4.2: The effect of length and size 
 
Out first conclusion from looking at the graph is that the effect of length has an overall 
larger effect than size because the horizontal distance between lengths’ letters is greater. 
Furthermore, the graph shows that length and size has the complete opposite effect on the 
likelihood of death. Not surprisingly, the longer a hunger strike is, the more likely is death to 
occur. Both factors increase the likelihood of the outcome forced end, but the effect of length 
is slightly stronger. Although both variables does not have a significant effect on concession 
compared to surrender, the graph suggests that the effect of size is slightly positive, while the 
effect of length is none. These findings suggest a slight advantages in maximizing the number 
of hunger strikers rather than maximizing the length of the hunger strike.  
                                                 
11
 Mlogplot is a user-written program for Stata made by Long and Freese (2005). 
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Now, how does the odds-ratios translate into probabilities? Table 4.8, as presented in Section 
4.4, shows that a standard deviation of length and size results in almost the exact increase in 
the probability of forced end, respectively 0.045 and 0.044. We also see that a standard 
deviation increase in size decreases the probability of surrender by -0.044, compared to length 
which decreases its probability by -0.029.  
 A problem with comparing the effects of size and length is that they have very 
different averages. It means that when we discuss the effect of length, when all else equal, it 
implies when size is 356, which is its average. Because most hunger strikes consists of only 
one person, this creates a false impression. When recalculating the predicted probability of a 
standard deviation increase in length on the outcome forced end, size set to 1, all else equal, 
the increase in probability is only 0.034. Doing the same with size, the standard deviation 
increase in size on the outcome forced end when length is 1, all else equal, the increase in 
probability is reduced to 0.025. This means that the actual effect of prolonging a hunger strike 
when only one person is striking is a lot smaller, regarding the probability of forced end. 
 What about the outcome surrender? A standard deviation increase in length, size set to 
1, all else equal, decreases the probability of outcome surrender by -0.034. With a standard 
deviation increase in size, length set to 1, all else equal, probability of outcome being 
surrender decreases by -0.043. This means that the difference between size and length is not 
as big as presented in Table 4.8 with regards to the outcome surrender. These estimates can 
also be interpreted in a real situation.  
Let’s picture a hypothetical single hunger striker on the first day of the hunger strike. 
If the hunger strikers’ strategy is to continue the hunger strike alone for 56 days (a standard 
deviation of length), the probability of the hunger strike ending in surrender would decrease 
by -0.034. If the strategy instead was to get 2650 people (a standard deviation of size) to join 
the hunger strike, the probability of the outcome being surrender would decrease by -0.43. In 
these examples, both strategies seem like a lot of efforts for a small positive change in the 
likelihoods. A few extreme hunger strikes in terms of sizes and lengths are the reasons why a 
standard deviation is a large change. In the following section I will test whether these extreme 
observations actually drives the results and should be deleted. 
Now, let’s see whether the predicted probabilities of the effect of length on outcome 
forced end is different in democracies and non-democracies. Table 4.11 lists these 
probabilities ranging from 0.5 to 100 days. It shows that the difference ranges from 0.04 to 
0.10. The difference increases gradually being largest when the strike has lasted 100 days. 
The effect is also slightly bigger in non-democracies. 
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Table 4.11: Predicted probabilities of forced end 
Length 
(days) 
Predicted probabilities 
Democracy 
Non-
democracy Difference 
1 0.09 0.13 0.05 
5 0.13 0.19 0.06 
10 0.15 0.22 0.07 
20 0.17 0.25 0.08 
50 0.21 0.30 0.09 
100 0.23 0.33 0.10 
    
The results from Table 4.9 and Figure 4.2 rejects Hypothesis 1 which claims that the length of 
the hunger strike increases the likelihood of concession. Length seems to have no effect on 
the outcome concession.  
The results also confirm Hypothesis 2, which claims that the length of the hunger 
strike increases the likelihood of forced end. The odds of forced end are 1.3 times greater 
relative to surrender for each additional day. The probability of forced end increases from 
about 1.7 at day 1 to 4.2 at day 750. Its effect on forced end is not significant relative to 
concession, which is symptomatic for the whole model’s inefficiency to distinguish between 
concession and forced end. 
Hypothesis 3, which claims that hunger strike size increases the likelihood of 
concessions should be rejected. Figure 4.2 shows that the direction of the effects points in this 
direction, but it is not significant relative to the reference outcome surrender. The odds of 
concession only increases by a factor of 1.06 relative to surrender. The finding points in the 
same direction as the hypothesis, but additional research must be conducted in order to find 
eventual support for this relationship. 
The results support Hypothesis 4, which claims that hunger strike size increases the 
likelihood of forced end, although the effect is not large. For each additional hunger striker 
the odds of forced end increases by a factor of 1.2. Also here, the effect on forced end is not 
significant relative to concession, but its effect is still convincing when significant relative to 
the other two outcomes. The increases in probabilities suggest that the impact of size is 
strong, increasing from 0.15 with one person to just under a probability of 0.4 with 50 000 
participates.  
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Hypothesis 5, which claims that when hunger strikes are conducted at multiple 
locations it increases the likelihood the outcome being forced end is rejected on the basis that 
the variable did not significantly contribute to the model and had no significant coefficients. 
 Motivations 4.4.2
The variables that give the largest coefficients are also in this case those that explains the 
least. The observations captured by the two motivation dummy variables combined amounts 
to only 10 percent.  
Figure 4.3 plots the effects of the two different motivations being either peace, war 
and conflict or immigration and asylum. The coefficients of the variables are plotted as 
markers with confidence intervals as spikes. In addition, by applying weights to the markers, 
the size of the markers is proportional to the inverse of the standard errors as to indicate their 
reliability. An plausible explanation is that this category of hunger strikers in most cases will 
strike for their own personal benefits, not a larger struggle. It is the latter that makes martyrs 
effective politically, not the first. 
 Figure 4.3: Effects of different motivations  
 
 
Hypothesis 6, which claims that the likelihood of gaining concessions depend on the type of 
political motivation finds some support in the results, although only two of eight categories 
are tested. The motivation immigration and asylum rights is the only significant variable in 
the second analysis (N = 285). The odds of concession when this is the motivation are 9.8 
times greater relative to surrender. The extremely high coefficients from this variable suggest 
that we may be dealing with coincidences that inflate the results due to the small sample. The 
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results should therefore be interpreted with caution. This hypothesis is therefore only partly 
supported. 
 Political context 4.4.3
Table 4.12 lists all pair of outcomes with significance levels over 0.06. It reveals that although 
it is significant on several outcomes, the effect of Polity IV is relatively small. The change in 
odds for all outcomes is close to one. The effect of hunger striking in a country with a higher 
level of democracy increases the odds of surrender and death, and decreases the likelihood of 
concession and forced end. The odds of concession relative to death and surrender decreases 
by factors of 0.93 and 0.96, respectively. The odds of forced end relative to death decreases 
by a factor of 0.9 while it decreases by a factor of 0.93 relative to surrender. The strongest 
effect of democracy is the change in odds of death relative to forced end which is 1.1 times 
greater. On the same pair of outcomes, a standard deviation increase in democracy gives odds 
that are the double.   
Table 4.12: Odds ratios of the effect of Polity2 on pair of outcomes 
Odds comparing 
Alternative 1 to  
Alternative 2 Coef. P>z e^b e^bStdX 
Concession – Death -0.073 0.045 0.930 0.586 
Concession – Surrender -0.041 0.052 0.959 0.738 
Death – Concession 0.073 0.045 1.076 1.705 
Death – Forced end 0.101 0.028 1.106 2.093 
Forced end – Death -0.101 0.028 0.904 0.478 
Forced end – Surrender -0.069 0.053 0.933 0.601 
Surrender – Concession 0.041 0.052 1.042 1.356 
Surrender – Forced end 0.069 0.053 1.072 1.664 
 
Table 4.13 lists the odds ratios of comparing pairs on the effect of coalition governments that 
are significant over the 0.05 level. Only the pair of concession and surrender are significant. If 
the hunger strike takes place in a country run by a coalition government the odds of 
concession is 2.3 times greater relative to surrender. This is a relative strong effect.  
Table 4.13: Odds ratios of the effect of coalition government on pair of outcomes 
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Odds comparing 
Alternative 1 to  
Alternative 2 Coef. P>z e^b e^bStdX 
Concession – Surrender 0.814 0.018 2.257 1.450 
Surrender – Concession -0.814 0.018 0.443 0.690 
 
 
Figure 4.4 shows the effect of the level of democracy (Polity IV) and coalition government. It 
shows that the effect of Polity IV is bigger than coalition government because the distance of 
the letters furthest to the left and right is longer. 
 Figure 4.4: The effect of democracy and coalition government 
 
Figure 4.5 plots the predicted probabilities of the effects of Polity IV on concession, surrender 
and forced end. Even though the Polity IV scale ranges from -10 to 10, there’s no 
observations in a country having the score -10 in this sample. The graph shows that the curves 
for concession and forced end are almost parallel. The probability for both decreases as the 
level of democracy decreases. The curve for surrender points the opposite direction, 
increasing its probability in higher levels of democracy. In countries ranged from 5 to 10, 
surrender is the most probable outcome, all else being equal. In countries ranged between -10 
to 5, concession is the most probable outcome. Only in the two most authoritarian types of 
regimes (-10 to -9), forced end are more probable than surrender. 
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Figure 4.5: Predicted probabilities of the effects of Polity IV 
 
Hypothesis 7, which claims that a hunger strike is more likely to gain a concession in a 
country run by a coalition governments, is supported by this results. When size increases by 
one unit, the odds of concession relative to surrender are 2.3 times greater. The effect of 
coalition government on concession is only significant relative to surrender, but the chi
2
-tests 
confirms that this is a significant effect that is valuable to the model. 
 Hypothesis 8, which claims that higher levels of democracy increases the likelihood of 
concession is rejected. The relationship between appears to be the opposite, where a higher 
level of democracy decreases the likelihood of concession. 
Why do non-democracies tend to give more concessions then democracies? A part of 
the difference can be explained by the fact that protesters have much more to lose in non-
democracies than in democracies, because of possible repercussions. 
 Learning process 4.4.4
Figure 4.6 shows the effect of hunger strike frequency. It shows that death is the only 
outcome that is significantly affected compared to the other outcomes. Surrender and 
concession show almost the same effect relative to death, while forced end is the most likely 
relative to death. 
Figure 4.6: The effect of hunger strike frequency 
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Table 4.14 lists the odds ratios of the effect of hunger strike frequency in pair of comparing 
outcomes. The coefficients of the pairs are very similar, confirming that relative to death, the 
effect if hunger strike frequency on the other three variables almost equal. The largest effect 
here is the effect on death relative to death where the odds are decreased by a factor of 0.255 
which means that the odds are one fourth. 
Table 4.14: Odds ratios of the effect of hunger strike frequency on pair of outcomes 
Odds comparing 
Alternative 1 to  
Alternative 2 Coef. P>z e^b e^bStdX 
Concession – Death 1.175 0.010 3.239 2.802 
Death – Concession -1.175 0.010 0.309 0.357 
Death – Forced end -1.365 0.003 0.255 0.302 
Death – Surrender -1.149 0.008 0.317 0.365 
Forced end – Death 1.365 0.003 3.917 3.311 
Surrender – Death 1.149 0.008 3.156 2.739 
 
Figure 4.7 shows the predicted probabilities of hunger strike frequency on outcome death. It 
shows that when a hunger strike takes place in a country with no prior experience of hunger 
strikes, all else equal, the probability of death is just over 0.02. The probability is halved at 
about the point where the country has experienced about 70 hunger strikes. The effect then 
gradually diminishes until it almost reaches the bottom at the experience of 350 hunger 
strikes. In sum this means that the impact of hunger strike frequency on death is substantial, 
but it only changes the probability within a very narrow range. 
Figure 4.7: Predicted probabilities of hunger strike frequency 
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Hypothesis 9, which claims that the more hunger strikes a country has experiences the higher 
is the likelihood of the outcome being concession, is rejected. Its effect on concession is not 
significant relative to any other variables than death. Figure 4.6 shows that the position of 
concession is slightly to the right of surrender, but it’s not significant. 
 Hypothesis 10, which claims that the experience of hunger strike decreases likelihood 
of death, is supported. But the effect does not mean a huge change in probabilities. 
 Evaluation of the hypothesis 4.4.5
To sum up the evaluation of the hypothesis, Table 4.15 lists the hypothesis, the actual effects 
and the evaluation. Out of the ten hypothesis, four are supported, one partly supported and 
five rejected. Out of the six hypothesis that concerns the outcome concession, only one is 
fully supported, while one are partly supported. The hypothesis concerning death is supported, 
while two out of three hypothesis concerning forced end are supported. 
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Table 4.15: Evaluation of the hypothesis  
Hypothesis Result Evaluation 
H1: The longer a hunger strike lasts, the higher 
is the likelihood that the outcome is concession. 
There is no effect of length 
on  the outcome concession. 
Hypothesis 
rejected 
H2:  The longer a hunger strike lasts, the higher 
is the likelihood that the outcome is forced end. 
Length has the anticipated 
effect on the outcome forced 
end. 
Hypothesis 
supported. 
H3: The more participants that engage in a 
hunger strike, the higher is the likelihood that the 
outcome is concession. 
There is not a significant 
effect of size on the outcome 
concession. 
Hypothesis 
rejected. 
H4:  The more participants that engage in a 
hunger strike, the higher is the likelihood that the 
outcome is concession. 
Size has the anticipated 
effect on the outcome forced 
end. 
Hypothesis 
supported. 
H5: When a hunger strike is carried out in more 
than one location, the likelihood that the 
outcome is forced end is higher. 
There is no effect of multiple 
locations of the outcome 
concession. 
Hypothesis 
rejected. 
H6: The likelihood of the outcome being 
concession depend on the hunger strike’s type of 
political motivation. 
There is an effect, as 
anticipated. But only two 
categories have been tested. 
 
Hypothesis partly 
supported. 
 
H7: A hunger strike is more likely to gain a 
concession in a country run by a coalition 
government than in a country run by a non-
coalition government.  
Coalition governments has 
the anticipated effect on the 
outcome concession.  
Hypothesis 
supported. 
H8: A hunger strike is more likely to gain a 
concession in a country with a higher level of 
democracy. 
The effect of level of 
democracy is the opposite of 
that anticipated. 
Hypothesis 
rejected. 
H9: The more hunger strikes a country has 
experienced, the higher is the likelihood of the 
outcome being concession. 
There is no significant 
effect between experience 
and the outcome 
concession. 
Hypothesis 
rejected. 
H10: The more hunger strikes a country has 
experienced, the smaller is the likelihood of the 
outcome being death. 
Experience has the 
anticipated effect on the 
outcome death. 
Hypothesis 
supported. 
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 Robustness and diagnostics 4.5
 Different measures of size 4.5.1
As mentioned in Section 3.2.1, the hunger strike dataset includes three different measures of 
hunger strike size that have a substantial variation. In order to test whether these different 
measures of size have any impact on my model’s fit, I’ve run separate regression models 
substituting the end-size with the other two measures. Figure 4.8 shows the predicted 
probability of the three different measures of size on each of the four outcomes.  
Figure 4.8: Comparing three measures of size 
 
 
 
 
The curves of the outcome concession distinguishes themselves from the rest as being more 
scattered than the others. Concession is also the only outcome that size doesn’t have a 
significant effect on. The effect of the other two measures of size does not have a significant 
effect on concession, although they give different curves. In sum, the different measures seem 
to have little impact on the model. 
 Measuring democracy 4.5.2
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Here, I will test the robustness of the variable Polity2. I will re-run the full model (Model 7) 
with the ACLP/DD dummy variable instead of Polity2. First, I compare the fitted values of 
each variable across years in Figure 4.9. We see that although the two variables have different 
scales, their average democracy scores seems consistent in the time period between 1946 and 
2004. 
Figure 4.9: Fitted values for Polity2 and ACLP/DD 
 
The LR tests with hypothesis that the two models are the same, run on all outcomes, are all 
rejected. This means the impact of ACLP/DD and Polity2 on the model is different. Since the 
scales of the two variables are different, this is predictable. The estimates of Model 8, which 
includes ACLP/DD are listed in Table 5 in Appendix D. The estimates shows that the effect 
of ACLP/DD is around ten times the effect of Polity2, which is consistent given their different 
scale. The other effects are not changed significantly, which indicates that the having used 
ACLP/DD instead of Polity2 would not have had any consequences for the results. 
 Inspecting the residuals 4.5.3
Diagnostics and assessment of fit and of the models is more difficult in multinomial logit 
models, because we are examining a fitted value for each outcome (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 
2000: 280-281). Begg and Gray (1984) have suggested to solve this by running separate 
binary logistic models for each outcome and then generate residuals for each model. 
Coefficients obtained from separate binary regressions have proved to be fairly consistent 
with the coefficients of running them as one multinomial model (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 
2000: 278). Residuals will give an impression of the model’s ability to fit the different 
outcomes. Figure 1 in the Appendix C shows the residuals of separate binary regression 
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models. The residuals of the observations are values between 0 and 1 where 0 is a perfect fit 
and 1 a complete misfit. Dispersion away from 0 means that the model does not manage to 
predict the outcome. It is evident from the figures that the model has a hard time managing to 
predict the outcomes death and forced end, while concession and surrender have a better fit. 
 Influential observations 4.5.4
There’s several measures of extreme values in linear regression analysis. First, if an 
observation have large residuals, it means that the model is not able to explain its outcome 
and it is often called an outlier. Second, if an observation have a value on the independent 
variable that deviate notably from the mean, it has a high leverage on the model. Third, if the 
observation has both a large residual and a high leverage, it is an influential observation. If a 
single observation has a disproportional influence on the result, it is a potential problem, 
especially in small sample models (Midtbø, 2012: 117-118). Models can be tested for 
influential observations with the Stata program Dbeta. It detects influential observations by 
re-fitting the regression model with and without all observations. There’s two competing rules 
on what constitutes an influential observation. The liberal rule of thumbs says values should 
be under 1, while the conservative and more flexible rule says the values should not exceed 
 √   , where k denotes number of independent variables and N denotes number of 
observations in the dataset (Baum, 2006: 128). With 7 independent variables and 285 
observations the “cut-off” value will be 0.335. 
 For the binary regression with the outcome concession, no observations exceeds the 
cut-off value. The most influential observation reaches 0.3. A closer look reveals that this 
observation is a hunger strike that was motivated by “peace, war and conflict”, carried out in a 
country with a coalition government and Polity2 score 10 (most democratic), that gained 
concession. The reason why this is influential is probably because the observations’ 
combination of outcome and set of properties is uncommon. For the outcome surrender, no 
observations exceeds dbeta score of 0.21. For the outcome forced end, there is one 
observation with dbeta score of 0.354. This is a hunger strike with the motivation being 
“immigration and asylum” that ended in forced end. This observation probably also got a high 
dbeta score because its very uncommon in the dataset that a hunger strike with this motivation 
ends with forced end. 
 Concerning the outcome death, there’s seven influential observations above the cut-off 
threshold, some of whom are extremely influential. The observations are plotted in Figure 2 in 
Appendix E. In this plot, the outcome of the observations are marked with 1 if they are deaths. 
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This shows that six out of seven influential observations are deaths. The most influential 
observation was a hunger striker that died after 12 days, which is uncommon under normal 
circumstances. In addition the hunger striker was motivated by peace, war and conflict, a 
motivation which is also uncommon. A closer look at the data confirms that the information 
about this observation is correct. 
 While it is never advisory to delete influential observations that are a natural part of 
the population, it can be useful to compare models with and without these observations in 
order to see how they affect the model (Midtbø, 2012: 119). Model 9 is run without the seven 
observations (estimates are found in Appendix D). The dbeta scores of the outcome death for 
Model 9 is found in Appendix E, Figure 3 (cut-off limit now set to 0.31). Here, we see that 
three new observations are influential. This implies that there’s not enough observations with 
the outcome death to properly explain it. Removing observations will only reduce the amount 
of observations and not solve the underlying problem. To conclude, because of the low 
number of observations with the outcome death, there’s some uncertainty to the results 
concerning death. 
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 Conclusion and final remarks 5
This thesis started with the question: what determines hunger strikes outcomes? In this final 
chapter I will evaluate how well the question has been answered. First I will give a summary 
of my main findings. Then I will discuss potential theoretical and political implications. 
Finally, I briefly suggest how this question could be better answered in the future. 
My aim in this thesis has been to analyze hunger strike as a tactic within the framework of 
social movements theory. The findings of this thesis can contribute to the prediction of where, 
when and how hunger strikes are most likely to reach their intended goals. 
Using a dataset consisting of media-reported hunger strikes, I’ve demonstrated that a 
combination of hunger strike-specific- and political context factors can, to some extent, 
determine what I have identified as four distinct outcomes in hunger strikes. The unique 
dataset made by Scanlan et al. (2008) with a of total 1441 hunger strikes ranging between 
1906 and 2004, has for the first time in this thesis been used to statistically test hypotheses 
regarding hunger strike outcomes. Having to deal with a lot of missing data, the dataset has 
been a challenge. In order to know specifically what I was measuring, the number of 
observations was reduced to 445. Furthermore, in order to use the variables size and length, 
the number of observations was reduced to 285.  
This dataset is to my knowledge the only quantitative collection of hunger strikes that 
exists today. Prior to this thesis, no one has done a quantitative analysis on hunger strike 
outcomes. Therefore, a good theoretical foundation was important. Social movements theory 
contributed with some underlying assumptions on why protest may succeed or fail. Research 
on other related protest tactics was important in shaping the theoretical framework. But as 
hunger strikes differ from all other types of protest tactics, the existing literature proved 
somewhat insufficient. In the process of creating hypothesis, I’ve therefore also used 
descriptive statistics as cross-correlations, tables and plots in order to find trends and patterns 
that can enhance the understanding of how hunger strikes work. My hypotheses have 
therefore derived from a combination of clear patterns in the dataset and literature within 
studies of social movements, in addition to some historical descriptive literature on hunger 
strikes. 
 While studies on social movements and protest tactics have been oriented around the 
question of success, I have argued that in the study of hunger strikes, it gives more substance 
to talk about different outcomes. Building on sociological studies on hunger strikes, I’ve 
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identified four distinct outcomes that can be applied to all types of hunger strikes (concession, 
surrender, death and forced end). 
Because no one has done a quantitative analysis of hunger strikes before, this analysis 
has to some extent been an exploratory analysis. At the same time, my statistical method – 
multinomial logit – already involves many parameters which limit the number of independent 
variables. 
 Summary of the main findings 5.1.1
The most important findings can be summarized in three main points: (1) coalition 
governments are more willing to give concessions than non-coalition governments, (2) a 
country’s experience with hunger strikes reduces the likelihood of hunger strikers dying, (3) 
non-democracies are more willing to give concessions to hunger strikers than democracies. 
Within the hunger strike specific factors, type of motivation, size and length proved to 
have an effect on the outcomes. Contrary to my hypothesis, length does not have an effect on 
the outcome concession. It was hypothesized that the more people hunger striking would 
increase the likelihood of gaining concession, but this effect was not statistically significant. 
My anticipation that carrying out a hunger strike in multiple locations has an effect on the 
likelihood of gaining concession proved to be wrong. Actually, the variable did not have an 
effect on any outcomes. Still, there’s some uncertainty to whether this variable really 
measures what it was intended to.  
Within the political context factors, level of democracy and whether the government is 
a party coalition both have an effect on hunger strike outcomes. Based on political 
opportunity structures, it was expected that coalition governments give more concessions to 
hunger strikers. The findings proved this hypothesize to be correct. The odds of the outcome 
being concession, relative to surrender, are 2.3 times greater when a coalition government 
runs the country. 
Contradictory to the general assumption from political opportunity structures, non-
democracies give more concessions to hunger strikers than democracies, all else being equal. 
As anticipated, non-democracies are also more willing to use force to stop the hunger striker. 
The reason why democracies are less willing to concede to hunger strikers is not fully 
explained in this thesis. A part of this difference can be explained by the fact that protesters 
have much more to lose in non-democracies because of potential repercussions, and that the 
threshold for starting a hunger strike consequently is higher. 
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The experience variable hunger strike frequency proved to be a significant factor in 
reducing the likelihood of deaths occurring, while insignificant with regards to concessions. 
This implies that a learning factor is present, and that states possible learn how to avoid death 
without giving more concessions or using more force than necessary. However, model 
diagnostics reveal that the models’ inability to explain deaths, due to the small number of 
observations, results from several extremely influential observations on which the results 
depends. The findings concerning death should therefore be treated as uncertain 
Six of my eleven hypotheses concern the outcome concession. Among them were only 
one fully supported and two partly supported. A possible reason for this is that this outcome is 
too broadly defined, also including concessions representing less what the hunger striker 
initially demanded. 
 Further research  5.1.2
Kitschelt (1986: 84) claims that: “Theories are fruitful only if they can be applied to cases 
beyond the ones they were first designed to explain”. Hopefully, the findings in my thesis can 
also apply to cases not included in the analysis. However, as I mentioned, having to rely on a 
dataset with large amounts of missing data, is not promising when it comes to the ability to 
generalize.  
Further research on hunger strikes should aim to get a better understanding of how 
factors such as experience of hunger strikes and the ability to learn from them affect 
outcomes. This will add an important dimension of time and space to the existing framework.  
 Following in the lines on the quantitative methods, a future research project should use 
the multilevel analysis in order to separate the effects of factors specific to the hunger strikes 
and specific to the political context. This will possibly give a much richer understanding of 
the dynamic relationship between these two levels. 
This thesis has only scratched upon the surface of the tactic of hunger strikes. 
Additional research is needed in order to understand the dynamics of a protest tactic that is 
not likely to disappear anytime soon.
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  Appendix A
 
Table 1: Centered variance inflation factors (VIFs) 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
United States 7.56 0.132221 
Hunger strike frequency 6.66 0.150166 
Polity IV 1.65 0.605353 
Coalition government 1.46 0.685301 
Peace, war and conflict 1.43 0.698209 
Size 1.40 0.713976 
Length 1.36 0.734316 
Multiple locations 1.29 0.776188 
Incarcerated 1.24 0.803782 
Immigration and asylum 1.10 0.910218 
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  Appendix B
 
 
Table 3: Hausman test (N=285) 
Omitted chi2 df P>chi2 evidence 
Concession 0.547 7 0.999 for Ho 
Death 0.074 8 1.000 for Ho 
Forced end -0.434 13 --- --- 
Surrender 4.170 15 0.997 for Ho 
H0: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Small-Hsiao test (N=288) 
Omitted lnL(full) lnL(omit) chi2 df P>chi2 evidence 
Concession -120.044 -68.499 103.090 16 0.000 against Ho 
Death -164.411 -125.048 78.726 16 0.000 against Ho 
Forced end -131.352 -89.970 82.764 16 0.000 against Ho 
H0: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives. 
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  Appendix C
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Residuals for all four outcomes 
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  Appendix D
Table 5: Estimates from Model 8 (ACLP/DD) 
  Model 8 
(ACLP/DD) 
 Model 9  
(Ex. influent. obs.) 
OUTCOME VARIABLES Coef. S.E.  Coef. S.E. 
       
CONCESSION Peace, war, and conflict -0.77 (0.44)  -1.15*** (0.21) 
 Immigration and asylum 2.34*** (0.36)  2.28*** (0.39) 
 ACLP/DD -0.51 (0.33)    
 Coalition government 0.82* (0.37)  0.89** (0.32) 
 Hunger strike frequency -0.0072 (0.13)  0.089 (0.10) 
 log(Length) 0.015 (0.12)  0.00096 (0.12) 
 log(Size) 0.060 (0.083)  0.069 (0.082) 
 Polity2    -0.046* (0.021) 
 Constant 0.0084 (0.11)  -0.032 (0.10) 
DEATH Peace, war, and conflict -0.20 (1.59)  -14.0*** (0.90) 
 Immigration and asylum -11.5*** (0.84)  -11.5*** (1.06) 
 ACLP/DD 0.014 (0.60)    
 Coalition government 0.31 (0.74)  -1.16 (1.07) 
 Hunger strike frequency -1.00** (0.36)  -0.84*** (0.24) 
 log(Length) 0.96** (0.33)  0.96*** (0.26) 
 log(Size) -0.36 (0.22)  -0.85 (0.51) 
 Polity2    0.046 (0.041) 
 Constant -3.52*** (0.31)  -5.47*** (0.83) 
FORCED END Peace, war, and conflict -1.20*** (0.22)  -1.14*** (0.21) 
 Immigration and asylum 1.53** (0.53)  1.44** (0.56) 
 ACLP/DD -0.88 (0.55)    
 Coalition government 0.36 (0.54)  0.44 (0.49) 
 Hunger strike frequency 0.16 (0.18)  0.25 (0.19) 
 log(Length) 0.29 (0.15)  0.27 (0.15) 
 log(Size) 0.15 (0.079)  0.16* (0.079) 
 Polity2    -0.073* (0.036) 
 Constant -0.82*** (0.19)  -0.85*** (0.19) 
       
 Observations 285 
-315 
0.084 
 278 
-294 
0.096 
 Log likelihood  
 Pseudo R-squared  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Figure 2: Dbeta scores for outcome death (Model 7) 
 
Figure 3: Dbeta scores for outcome death (Model 9) 
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